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Executive Summary 
 
This report summarizes the JRC/IPTS modelling activities for the Communication "Towards 
a comprehensive climate change agreement in Copenhagen", published on 28/1/2009. 
 
Policy background 
The European Union agreed to limit the average global temperature increase to less than 2°C 
compared to pre-industrial levels. Several European Commission Communications have dealt 
with the required global climate policies to attain such temperature target before. Firstly, the 
March 2005 Communication 'Winning the Battle Against Global Climate Change' highlighted 
the need for a broad international participation in the efforts in tackling climate change. 
 
The European Council of March 2005 acknowledged this and also requested the European 
Commission to further deepen its analysis. As a result, the European Commission adopted the 
January 2007 Communication on 'Limiting Global Climate Change to 2 degrees Celsius - The 
way ahead for 2020 and beyond', where global climate policy scenarios for 2020 and beyond 
were explored. 
 
Following that Communication, in March 2007 the European Council endorsed a firm 
independent EU commitment to reduce greenhouse gases by at least 20 % by 2020 compared 
to 1990; this target will be extended to 30 % under a comprehensive international agreement 
that broadens global participation and if other developed countries commit themselves to 
comparable emission reductions. At the same time, the Council adopted an 'Energy Policy for 
Europe' supporting amongst others a 20% renewable energy target by 2020, improvements in 
energy efficiency and other low carbon sources which will help in achieving the required 
emission reductions. 
 
The 2007 Bali Action Plan started a process in order to reach an international agreement on 
climate for the post-2012 period at the UN Conference to take place in Copenhagen in 
December 2009. In order to set out specific proposals for the climate agreement, in January 
2009 the European Commission has adopted the third of the Communications, titled 'Towards 
a comprehensive climate change agreement in Copenhagen'. 
 
 
Objectives and approach 
The objective of this report is to describe in detail the quantitative modelling work underlying 
the scenarios analysis of the 2009 Communication. The POLES world energy sector model 
and the multi-sector general equilibrium GEM-E3 model were used to assess the 
technological and economic effects of various scenarios that can meet the 2°C target. 
 
The two models are complementary as they focus on different relevant aspects. While POLES 
provides a rich analysis of the technologies of the energy sector at a global scale, computing 
the direct cost of reducing emissions in the energy sector, the GEM-E3 model has a multi-
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sector perspective that permits to assess the economic consequences in the whole economy, 
therefore assessing the direct and indirect effects of the mitigation policies foreseen in the 
Communication. 
 
One of the main purposes of the Communication has been to study the consequences of 
alternative targets by countries. This is certainly a key issue in the forthcoming negotiations 
for the post-2012 period because the distribution of mitigation costs across countries makes 
necessary to consider not only efficiency but also equity issues. In particular, four different 
criteria have been taken into account to prescribe alternative burden-sharing methodologies. 
Firstly, GDP per capita has been chosen as an indicator of wealth, and therefore ability to pay 
for mitigation actions. Secondly, the greenhouse gas (GHG) intensity of the economy, defined 
as the GHG emission per GDP, is an indicator of the potential to reduce emissions. Third, the 
observed GHG emission trend is considered an indicator of 'early action': the steeper the 
reduction has been since 1990, the less ambitious can the future reduction target be, therefore 
rewarding early mitigation effort (for Kyoto Annex I countries). Population growth is the 
fourth of the indicators that allow relatively less demanding emission reduction targets to 
countries that have experienced higher population growth in the recent past. 
 
Finally, a scenario that combines the four criteria, the 'central scenario', also consistent with 
the 2°C target, has been analysed using POLES and GEM-E3 models, as well. 
 
Another key aspect for assessing global climate policies is the way the international carbon 
markets operate. Several cases have been analysed: perfect global trading of permits (full 
trading across all countries and sectors), imperfect trade (international trading gradually 
develops in time including more countries and sectors) and absence of global trading (a 
situation where countries reach the reduction targets only through domestic policies and 
measures). In the central scenario the imperfect case has been taken into account. 
 
 
Results of the scenario exercise 
Baseline 
Global energy-related GHG emissions in the baseline scenario in 2020 are 71% higher above 
1990 levels. Emissions increase much faster in developing countries than in developed 
countries. It is estimated that the resulting increase of temperature by 2050 is around 2°C 
above the pre-industrial level. Moreover, the economic growth projections take into account 
the effect of the 2008/2009 financial crisis, following recent IMF economic forecasts. 
 
POLES 
Under the central scenario, all countries reduce their emission substantially below the baseline 
scenario in order to meet the EU two degrees temperature target. Developed countries reduce 
emissions by 30% in the 1990-2020 period, while the emissions of the developing countries 
are limited to 20% below their baseline emissions in 2020. Those reductions are achieved 
through an accelerated decommissioning of carbon-intensive technologies and their 
replacement by low-carbon, climate-friendly ones. Price signals via a carbon price play a 
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large role to attain such technological transformation, together with energy efficiency and 
savings policies. 
 
Concerning the contribution of the various technologies to reduce emissions, energy savings 
measures allow for substantial reductions compared to the baseline scenario in most sectors of 
the economy, notably in industry, transport, residential and services. Approximately such 
measures represent half of the global reduction in the 2020-2030 period, being close to 2/3 in 
the developing countries in 2020. In particular, a large potential for energy efficiency 
improvements in the power generation sector seems to be available at competitive costs. 
 
Fossil fuel switches towards less carbon intensive fossil fuels and cleaner technologies, 
together with renewable energies, nuclear and carbon sequestration are the other technologies 
absorbing the bulk of the reduction emissions worldwide. For instance, while in the year 2020 
the carbon capture and sequestration is virtually absent in the baseline scenario, under the 
central scenario 18% of fossil fuel power generation employs this technology. As a 
consequence, from a sectoral perspective, the power generation sector captures half of the 
overall reduction in the 2020-2030 period, the contribution of the industrial sector comes 
second, while the role of the transport and residential sectors is less prominent. 
 
The POLES model estimates that the annual global abatement costs, mainly in the energy and 
industrial sectors, are about €150 billion in 2020, being the cumulative global cost €666 
billion over the 2013-2020 period. Approximately 55% of those costs arise in developed 
countries. Those figures do not include the financial flows generated by international carbon 
emission trading. In terms of aggregated costs, the study reports that, for the central 
mitigation scenario, most countries would face costs amounting between 0.4 and 1.2% of their 
respective GDPs.  
 
GEM-E3 
The overall effect of the central scenario on world GDP in 2020 is estimated to be a decrease 
of 0.9%, compared to the baseline. While some developed countries, such as the EU27 and 
the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), have higher GDP reductions than the world, 
other economies such as China, India and Brazil have lower GDP losses. 
 
The GEM-E3 model has assessed the effects in developed countries of the allocation of 
targets according to a single criterion, instead of the combination of the four criteria (central 
scenario). Given that a single criterion lead often to disproportional costs or gains in single 
countries (e.g. for the case of the GDP per capita high income countries undergo very large 
GDP losses), it seems unlikely that the allocation of targets will be based on single criteria. 
The criteria used in the central scenario lead to smaller GDP changes in all developed 
countries, in the range of -0.6% to -2%, with the exception of the CIS, which undergoes a 3% 
GDP loss. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
8 
JJ RR
CC
  SS
cc ii
ee nn
tt ii
ff ii c
c   
aa nn
dd  
 TT
ee cc
hh n
n ii
cc aa
ll   R
R
ee pp
oo rr
tt   
Ec
on
om
ic
 A
ss
es
sm
en
t 
of
 P
os
t-
20
12
 G
lo
ba
l C
lim
at
e 
Po
lic
ie
s 
Carbon markets 
The central scenario assumes an imperfect global carbon market for the sectors included in 
the EU's Emission Trading System (ETS). The marginal abatement costs do not equalise 
across the sectors on a global scale, but instead these carbon prices vary across the various 
regions in the world because of differences in transaction costs. These costs are assumed to 
diminish over time, and the carbon prices tend to converge. 
 
The last chapter of the study compares the costs of climate policy in the central case (with an 
imperfect global carbon market) to the cases with a perfect global carbon market and without 
a global carbon market. With a perfect carbon market, the GDP changes are lower, being 
around -0.5% for the world economy, whereas with no global carbon market it becomes -1%. 
Regarding the marginal abatement costs, according to the POLES model, in the central 
scenario the carbon price in 2020 is 43 €/tCO2, increasing to 72 €/tCO2 without global trade 
and falling to 22 €/tCO2 if there is perfect trade on global level. Therefore, these results 
underline the role of international trading in attaining a cost-efficient international agreement 
beyond 2012. 
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 Introduction 
1 Introduction 
 
The European Union agreed to limit the average global temperature increase to less than 2°C 
compared to pre-industrial levels. In March 2005 the Communication 'Winning the Battle 
Against Global Climate Change' (European Commission, 2005) highlighted the need for a 
broad international participation in the efforts in tackling climate change.  
 
The European Council of March 2005 requested the European Commission to further deepen 
its analysis. As a consequence, in January 2007 the European Commission adopted the 
Communication on 'Limiting Global Climate Change to 2 degrees Celsius - The way ahead 
for 2020 and beyond' (European Commission, 2007a), where global climate policy scenarios 
for 2030 and beyond were explored. Russ et al. (2007) documents the scenario analysis and 
modelling work of JRC/IPTS for the 2007 Communication. 
 
After the Communication, in March 2007 the European Council endorsed a firm independent 
EU commitment to reduce greenhouse gases by at least 20 % by 2020 compared to 1990; this 
target will be extended to 30 % under a comprehensive international agreement that broadens 
global participation and if other developed countries commit themselves to comparable 
emission reductions. At the same time, the Council adopted an 'Energy Policy for Europe' 
supporting amongst others a 20% renewable energy target by 2020, improvements in energy 
efficiency and other low carbon sources, which will help in achieving the required emission 
reductions. 
 
The 2007 Bali Action Plan started a process in order to reach an international agreement on 
climate for the post-2012 period at the UN Conference4 to take place in Copenhagen in 
December 2009. In order to shape a comprehensive EU position ahead of the Conference, the 
European Commission has adopted the Communication titled 'Towards a comprehensive 
climate change agreement in Copenhagen'5, published on 28/1/2009. 
 
This report, which builds further on Russ et al. (2007)6, documents the JRC/IPTS modelling 
activities underlying that Communication. The POLES world energy sector model and the 
multi-sector computable general equilibrium GEM-E3 model have been used to assess the 
technological and economic effects of scenarios that can meet the EU 2°C target.  
 
The two global models are complementary. POLES provides a rich analysis of the 
technologies of the energy sector, computing the direct cost of mitigating greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions in the energy system and industrial emissions including other gases than 
CO2. GEM-E3 has a multi-sector perspective that permits to assess the economic 
consequences in the whole economy, therefore assessing the direct and indirect effects of the 
mitigation policies foreseen in the Communication. The GEM-E3 model covers all economy-
wide emissions except those from land-use change. 
 
 
                                                 
4  The 15th Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC. 
5  European Commission (2009a), http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/future_action.htm  
6  See also European Commission (2007b). 
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Five global mitigation scenarios have been analysed, which can lead to the 2°C objective. 
Under all scenarios in order to achieve the temperature target by 2020 developed countries as 
a group reduce their emissions by 30% below 1990 levels and developing countries as a group 
limit emissions to 15% to 30% below the business as usual scenario. Four criteria were used 
to allocate the reduction emissions to the countries: 1) "GDP (gross domestic product) per 
capita", as an indicator for the ability to bear mitigation costs; 2) "GHG emission per GDP", 
being an indicator of the potential to reduce emissions; 3) "Early action", the GHG emission 
trend since 1990, as an indicator of the ambitiousness of future reduction targets; and 4) 
"Population growth", as directly proportional indicator of emission reduction. The GEM-E3 
model has assessed the economic consequences of each of the four indicators separately 
applying them to the developed world regions. The fifth scenario consists of a combination of 
the four criteria, and its effects have been assessed both with the POLES and GEM-E3 
models. In this report this is called the "central scenario". 
 
The "central scenario" assumes an imperfect global carbon market for the sectors included in 
the EU's Emission Trading System (ETS). The marginal abatement costs do not equalise 
across the sectors on a global scale, but instead these carbon prices vary across the various 
regions in the world due to differences in transaction costs and market imperfections. These 
costs are assumed to diminish over time, and the carbon prices tend to converge. The POLES 
and GEM-E3 models have been used to compare the costs of climate policy in the central 
scenario with the two alternative cases: a perfect global carbon market and the absence of a 
global carbon market. 
 
This document has six more chapters in addition to this introduction. Chapter 2 presents the 
methodology and, in particular, the features of the POLES and GEM-E3 models. Chapter 3 
describes the baseline scenario. In chapter 4 the global mitigation scenarios are constructed. In 
chapter 5, POLES models the "central scenario". Subsequently, chapter 6 analyses the macro-
economic effects of the global mitigation scenarios (the "central scenario" and the four 
scenarios following the individual criteria) using the GEM-E3 general equilibrium model. 
Finally, in chapter 7 the role of a global carbon market is addressed. 
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2 Methodology 
 
The methodology of the present study is analogous to Russ et al. (2007). The report describes 
scenarios that have a 50% likelihood of limiting the increase in global temperatures to 2ºC 
above pre-industrial levels in line with the objectives of the European Council. The 
implications of these scenarios on the overall economy and the energy sectors in particular 
will be compared to the baseline. The JRC/IPTS modelling was done using the POLES and 
GEM-E3 models. 
 
2.1 POLES 
 
The POLES (Prospective Outlook for the Long term Energy System) model is a global 
sectoral simulation model for the development of energy scenarios until 2050. The dynamics 
of the model is based on a recursive (year by year) simulation process of energy demand and 
supply with lagged adjustments to prices and a feedback loop through international energy 
price. 
 
The model is developed in the framework of a hierarchical structure of interconnected 
modules at the international, regional and national level. It contains technologically-detailed 
modules for energy-intensive sectors, including power generation, iron and steel, the chemical 
sector, aluminium production, cement making, non-ferrous minerals and modal transportation 
sectors (including aviation). 
 
In each sector, energy consumption is calculated both for substitutable fuels and for 
electricity, taking into account specific energy consumption. Each demand equation has an 
income or activity variable elasticity, price elasticity, technological trends and, when 
appropriate, saturation effects. Particular attention is paid to the treatment of price effects. The 
world is broken down into 47 regions7, for which the model delivers detailed energy balances. 
There is a single world oil market (the "one great pool" concept), while three regional markets 
(America, Europe and Asia) are identified for gas, in order to take into account different cost, 
market and technical structures. Coal production and trade flows are modelled on a bilateral 
trade basis, thus allowing for the identification of a large number of geographical specificities 
and the nature of different export routes. 
 
All energy prices are determined endogenously in POLES. Oil prices in the long term depend 
primarily on the relative scarcity of oil reserves (i.e. the ratio of reserve to production). In the 
short run, the oil price is mainly influenced by spare production capacities of large oil 
producing countries. It must be noted that the endogenous price forming mechanism cannot 
model the price volatility induced by short term market expectations and/or geopolitical 
instabilities.  
 
The model is continuously being enhanced both in detail and by regional disaggregation. 
Recent modifications include the addition of detailed modules for energy-intensive sectors 
[see, e.g. Szabó et al., 2006], and the extension to cover non-CO2 greenhouse gases [see 
Criqui, 2002 and Criqui et al., 2006].  
                                                 
7 See Annex. 
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2.2 GEM-E3 
 
The world version of the General Equilibrium Model for Energy-Economy-Environment 
interactions (GEM-E3)8 is an applied general equilibrium model, representing simultaneously 
18 world regions, linked through endogenous bilateral trade. GEM-E3 covers the interactions 
between the economy, the energy system and the environment. The calibration of the model is 
based on empirical data. The output of GEM-E3 includes projections of input-output tables, 
employment, capital flows, government revenues, household consumption, energy use, and 
atmospheric emissions. The model allows the evaluation of the welfare and distributional 
effects of various environmental policy scenarios, including different burden sharing 
scenarios, environmental instruments9 and revenue recycling scenarios. 
 
The GEM-E3 model has the following general features. The model simultaneously computes 
the equilibrium prices of goods, services, labour, capital and tradable emission rights such that 
all markets clear under the Walras law. It integrates micro-economic behaviour into a macro-
economic framework and allows assessing the medium to long-term implications of policies. 
The model version for this exercise is global, while the sectors, the structural features of 
energy/environment and the policy instruments (e.g. taxation) are disaggregated. Hence, it can 
analyze the economic and distributional effects of environmental and economic policies for 
sectors, agents and regions, while ensuring that the world economy remains in equilibrium. 
 
The model is dynamic, driven by the accumulation of capital and equipment. Technological 
progress is explicitly represented in the production functions. The amount of capital is fixed 
within each period. The investment decisions of the firms in the current period affect the stock 
of capital in the next period. The allocation of investment across sectors and regions is based 
on their respective profitability. The model allows for various degrees of capital mobility 
(across sectors or regional borders). This means that firms can close down and start up in 
another sector (capital mobility across sectors), or start again in another world region (capital 
mobility across regions). 
 
The economic agents (firms, consumers) optimize their objective and determine the supply or 
demand of capital, energy, environment, labour and other goods. The firms' production uses 
capital, labour, energy (i.e. electricity and fuels) and intermediate consumption of goods from 
other branches. For each region, a representative consumer allocates his total expected income 
between consumption of goods and services (both durables and non-durables), savings and 
leisure. 
 
The demand of goods by the final consumers, the firms (for intermediate consumption and 
investment) and the public sector constitutes the total domestic demand. This total demand is 
allocated between domestic goods and imported goods, using the Armington specification. 
 
Government behaviour and policy are exogenous. The model distinguishes between 8 
categories of revenues, including indirect taxes, environmental taxes, direct taxes, value added 
taxes, production subsidies, social security contributions, import duties, and foreign transfers. 
                                                 
8 For a full model description see Van Regemorter (2005). 
9 E.g. taxes, various forms of pollution permits or command-and-control policy. 
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The environmental module of GEM-E3 can be extended to concentrate on three air pollution 
problems: (i) climate change (ii) acidification and eutrophication through deposition of 
emissions, and (iii) ambient air quality linked to tropospheric ozone concentration. 
 
The model evaluates the emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2), other GHG (e.g. CH4), and there 
is a possible extension for a number of other air pollutants (NOx, SO2, VOC, NH3, and PM10). 
There are three mechanisms of emission reduction: (i) substitution between fuels and between 
energetic and non-energetic inputs, (ii) emission reduction due to less production and 
consumption, and (iii) purchasing abatement equipment. 
 
 
2.3 Other models 
 
The modelling activities of JRC/IPTS for the Communication "Towards a comprehensive 
climate change agreement in Copenhagen" have been complemented by a number of other 
models10. These include: 
• IMAGE: Estimating the direct emissions and the potential for mitigation from 
agriculture using the land use change model of the integrated assessment model of the 
Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency (PBL, Planbureau voor de 
Leefomgeving). 
• TM5:  Estimating the effects of different GHG emission scenarios and their 
corresponding energy consumption on local air pollutants (JRC/IES). 
• G4M and GLOBIOM11: Assessing the potential for mitigation from both reduced 
deforestation and increased afforestation, and estimating the indirect emissions from 
deforestation due to agriculture, including increasing demands for bio-energy (IIASA). 
• GAINS Europe and GAINS Asia:  Assessing the inter-linkages between GHG and local 
air pollution abatement policies and their respective costs if applied in parallel (IIASA). 
• The JRC/IES provided a spreadsheet based tool to assess the impact of different 
accounting rules for the Land Use, Land Use Change and Forestry (LULUCF) sector for 
the current developed countries under the Kyoto Protocol based on historic data for the 
base year 1990 or the base period 1990-1999. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
10 A detailed description of the models can be found in Annex 1 of the Staff Working Document 
(European Commission, 2009b). 
11 Gusti et al. (2008). 
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2.4 Improvements and differences compared to 2007 
Study 
 
This report builds further on Russ et al. (2007), which summarizes the JRC/IPTS model 
activities for the 2007 Communication “Limiting global climate change to 2ºC”. Compared to 
Russ et al. (2007), the present analysis differs and is improved in the following ways: 
 
• In the baseline of this report, the carbon price in the EU ETS starts at 20 €/tCO2 in 2010 
and increases linearly to 24 €/tCO2 in 2030. This is similar to the approach that was 
used in the baseline scenario to assess the impact of the EU climate change and energy 
package12. Russ et al. (2007) assumed a baseline carbon price of 5 €/tCO2. 
• Despite the high oil price, total GHG emissions of energy and industry grow as fast in 
the present baseline as in the study of 2007 (Russ et al., 2007). 
• The present baseline takes the consequences of the financial crisis into account as was 
known by October (IMF, 2008). 
• This study analyses more scenarios with different targets for each single country based 
on indicators. 
• The present GEM-E3 modelling includes a gradually developing carbon market for all 
developing countries. 
 
 
 
                                                 
12 See European Commission (2008) and Capros et al. (2008). 
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3 The Baseline Scenario 
 
This Chapter describes the assumptions and conditions on which the baseline scenario has 
been built. POLES and GEM-E3 have calibrated their baseline scenario using these common 
assumptions and conditions. 
 
Moreover, five global mitigation scenarios have been developed, which can lead to the 2°C 
objective. These scenarios will be described in more detail in Chapter 4.  
 
 
3.1 Common assumptions 
 
The baseline scenario takes into account the existence of the ETS market in the EU and the 
prospect of future climate policies in other countries, the consequences of the financial crisis 
in 2008/2009, and the evolution of the oil prices. 
 
 
3.1.1 Baseline carbon price  
 
In the baseline, the carbon price in the EU ETS starts at 20 €/tCO2 in 2010 and increases 
linearly to 24 €/tCO2 in 2030. This is similar to the approach that was used in the baseline 
scenario to assess the impact of the EU climate change and energy package (Capros et al., 
2008). However, the baseline for the EU used for the present assessment does neither include 
the implementation of the unilateral GHG reduction target (20% compared to 1990 by 2020) 
nor the renewables target (20% by 2020) as proposed in the EU energy and climate change 
package, which were still under discussion when this assessment was made (European 
Commission, 2008). Therefore the baseline used in the present analysis does not include the 
outcome of the approved policy changes under the adopted climate change and energy 
package. 
 
In the other developed countries a 5 €/tCO2 carbon price is included for the same sectors as 
those included in the EU's ETS. This aims to simulate the fact that also in developed countries 
that presently lack ambitious climate change policies, investment decisions are already 
influenced by the prospect of future mitigation policies. 
 
 
3.1.2 GDP growth and the financial crisis 
 
In the baseline between 2005 and 2020, average yearly growth is 2.4% for developed 
countries and 5.3% for developing countries, resulting in a yearly average global growth of 
3.9%. The baseline takes into account the current financial crisis. The growth projections 
were adapted when the deterioration of growth prospects became obvious in autumn 2008. 
Growth rates were reduced for the main regions for the coming 2 years using the then most 
recent IMF economic forecasts (IMF, 2008). Afterwards, it is assumed that growth will return 
to higher levels. 
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3.1.3 Oil prices 
 
Oil prices in the updated baseline scenario differ from the ones in the 2007 Impact 
Assessment (European Commission, 2007a). While in the 2007 assessment prices of 53.2 
US$/bl in 2020 and 61.5 US$/bl in 2030 were assumed, in the present assessment prices are 
projected to reach 73 US$/bl in 2020 and 89 US$/bl in 2030 (in 2005 prices). The proposed 
oil price scenario entails also higher coal and gas prices than those presented in the 2007 
Impact Assessment. For comparison, these oil prices are lower than the most recent ones 
projected by the IEA in its World Energy Outlook 2008, which estimates price levels of 110 
US$/bl in 2020 and 122 US$/bl in 2030 (in 2007 prices)13. 
 
 
3.2 Total emissions in baseline for POLES 
 
Despite the high oil price, world GHG emissions of energy and industry grow as fast in this 
baseline as in the baseline for the 2007 Communication (European Commission, 2007a; Russ 
et al., 2007). In 2020 they are 71% above 1990 levels. This is mainly due to slightly higher 
economic growth forecasts for developing countries which have a high share of coal in their 
energy mix and a slightly higher share of coal in the global total primary energy mix. 
 
Global emissions, excluding LULUCF, increase by 63% over the period 1990-2020. They 
increased by 23% over the period 1990-2005 and are projected to increase by a further 33% 
over the period 2005-2020. The best estimate14 of resulting global average temperature 
increase in the baseline in 2050 is projected to be already around 2°C above pre-industrial 
level and continues to increase afterwards. 
 
Emissions increase faster in developing countries than in developed countries. In developed 
countries that are Annex I parties under the UNFCCC, GHG emissions, excluding LULUCF, 
decline by 2% in 2005 compared to 1990. Afterwards, baseline emissions increase again to 
reach 1990 levels by 2020. Emissions, excluding LULUCF, in developing countries increased 
significantly over the period 1990 to 2005 and are projected to increase at a slightly lower rate 
resulting in an increase of 166% over the period 1990 to 2020.15.  
                                                 
13  IEA (2008). 
14 The best estimate temperature projection was done using the MAGICC model, version 5.3. 
15  Annex 6 in European Commission (2009b) gives further information how this baseline 
relates to baseline projections of other studies, e.g. those used by the IPCC assessment reports 
that are based on the scenarios described in the Special Report on Emissions Scenarios (SRES). 
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Figure 1: Baseline emissions, all sectors 
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Source: POLES (JRC, IPTS), G4M (IIASA), Image (PBL)16 
 
3.2.1 Energy 
 
Emissions from energy use increase faster than emissions from other sources. On a global 
level energy related GHG emissions are projected to increase by 71% over the period 1990-
2020 (75% including international bunkers). For comparison, the IEA baseline for the World 
Energy Outlook 2008 projected an increase of these emissions between 1990 and 2020 of 
74%. 
 
Energy CO2 emissions are projected to increase by 6% and by 68% in 2020 compared to 2005 
in developed countries and developing countries, respectively. Energy GHG emissions from 
developing countries overtake those of developed countries before 2010. By 2020 they 43% 
above those of developed countries.  
 
3.2.2 Agriculture and deforestation 
 
Global emissions from agriculture17 grow at a lower speed than those of energy and industry. 
They increase by 30% over the period 1990-2020. Agricultural emissions in developed 
countries decreased substantially over the period 1990 – 2005 and are projected to remain 
fairly stable over the period 2005 – 2020, while those in developing countries are reported to 
                                                 
16  For a description of G4M and IMAGE model see Kindermann et al. (2006, 2008), and 
Bouwman (2006), respectively. 
The lower historic total emissions as compared to the figures given in the IPCC AR4 are due to the 
use of GWPs as defined in the IPCC SAR and different assumptions on emissions from 
deforestation. 
17  Emissions from agriculture are estimated by the IMAGE model. 
  
Ec
on
om
ic
 A
ss
es
sm
en
t 
of
 P
os
t-
20
12
 G
lo
ba
l C
lim
at
e 
Po
lic
ie
s 
18 
JJ RR
CC
  SS
cc ii
ee nn
tt ii
ff ii c
c   
aa nn
dd  
 TT
ee cc
hh n
n ii
cc aa
ll   R
R
ee pp
oo rr
tt   
have grown by 23% over the period 1990 - 2005 and are projected to continue to grow by 
51% over the period 1990 - 2005. 
 
Finally, annual emissions from gross deforestation decrease in the baseline by around 20% by 
2020, from a level of around 4.3 Gigaton CO2 per annum in 2005 to around 3.5 Gigaton CO2. 
This means that by 2020, the size of emissions from deforestation are about twice as high as 
the proposed EU ETS cap in the same year18. Almost all these emissions stem from 
deforestation in developing countries. 
 
 
3.3 The baseline for macro-economic assessment with 
GEM-E3 
 
The GEM-E3 is a computable general equilibrium model that can assess the macroeconomic 
effects of the various scenarios. The GTAP 6 database has been used to calibrate the GEM-E3 
model to its base year 2001. The baseline scenario to the year 2030 has been established by 
taking into account the GDP and CO2 emissions of the POLES baseline scenario and also the 
agricultural non-CO2 emissions which are not included in POLES. The resulting baseline is 
similar to the baseline based on the POLES + IMAGE models, even though the GEM-E3 
baseline is slightly higher (Table 1). 
 
Table 1: Baseline emissions in 2020, comparison POLES – GEM E3 
 
Increase of emission levels compared to 1990 in 2020 in % 
2020 
Developed 
countries 
vs 1990 
Developing 
countries 
vs 1990 
Baseline POLES + IMAGE 
(energy sector, industry and 
agriculture) 
-2% 166% 
Baseline GEM E3 model 
(energy sector, industry and 
agriculture) 
2% 156% 
Source: POLES, IMAGE, GEM-E3 
 
 
                                                 
18 Proposal for a Directive amending Directive 2003/87/EC so as to improve and extend the 
greenhouse gas emission allowance trading system of the Community (2008/0013 (COD)). 
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4 Global Mitigation Scenarios 
 
A global emission path compatible with the 2 degree target has been defined for both the 
POLES and GEM-E3 models, in the same way as in Russ et al. (2007).  
 
4.1 Targets for developed countries 
 
The IPCC defines 4 main drivers for GHG emissions, i.e. changes in energy and carbon 
intensity, population growth, and global per capita income growth. While these are often seen 
as drivers for emission growth, they can also be looked at as indicators for the ability to 
mitigate. The group of developed countries have a -30% target compared to 1990 in 2020, for 
which the targets of individual countries are allocated using a set of 4 indicators. The 
emissions of developing countries in 2020 are limited to 20% below the baseline emissions. 
 
The four indicators on which the targets of the individual country are based are GDP/capita, 
GHG/GDP, early action and population trends. The individual country targets for all 
developed countries of all options add up to reach the overall -30% emission reduction target 
in 2020 compared to 199019. Table 2 lists the four single indicators and their respective 
reduction targets, as well as the central scenario based on the 4 single indicators20. 
 
                                                 
19 The target for the group of developed countries as a whole is smaller than 30% as the table 
compares to 2005, and the emissions have decreased in the developed countries between 1990 
and 2005.  
20 See Annex in European Commission (2009b) for more details on how the Central Scenario was 
constructed. 
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Table 2: Targets for developed countries resulting from the four allocation options 
  GDP/cap GHG/GDP 
Early 
action 
Population 
trends 
Central 
Scenario 
 
G
D
P 
pe
r c
ap
ita
 in
 
10
00
€,
 2
00
5 
20
20
 T
ar
ge
t c
om
pa
re
d 
to
 2
00
5 
G
H
G
/G
D
P,
 2
00
5,
 in
 k
g 
of
 C
O
2 
pe
r U
S$
(2
00
0)
 
20
20
 T
ar
ge
t c
om
pa
re
d 
to
 2
00
5 
G
H
G
 tr
en
d 
19
90
 to
 2
00
5 
in
 %
 
20
20
 T
ar
ge
t c
om
pa
re
d 
to
 2
00
5 
Po
pu
la
tio
n 
tre
nd
 1
99
0 
to
 2
00
5 
in
 %
 
20
20
 T
ar
ge
t c
om
pa
re
d 
to
 2
00
5 
20
20
 T
ar
ge
t c
om
pa
re
d 
to
 2
00
5 
EU 22.5 -25.1% 0.43 -20.1% -8% -22.4% 4.0% -38.1% -24% 
USA 33.8 -45.3% 0.53 -26.8% 16% -41.5% 17.1% -13.1% -34% 
Japan 28.7 -37.1% 0.24 -6.1% 7% -36.1% 3.5% -38.4% -29% 
Canada 28.3 -36.5% 0.67 -32.5% 25% -46.8% 16.5% -14.4% -39% 
Australia, 
New Zealand 
26.9 -34.2% 0.77 -36.7% 27% -47.9% 20.3% -6.2% -38% 
Other OECD 
Europe 
45.7 -64.5% 0.19 -2.1% 5% -35.1% 9.1% -30.5% -30% 
Commonwealth 
of Independent 
States 
3.6 15.5% 4.66 -46.0% -35% 6.0% -4.6% -42.7% -12% 
Developed 
countries 
 -27.3%  -27.3%  -27.3%  -27.3% -27% 
 
 
4.1.1 "GDP per capita" scenario 
 
GDP/capita is selected as a first simple indicator that could be used to attribute a reduction 
target to a country. The higher the indicator, the more stringent the reduction target is set. The 
income level of a country determines to a large extent the ability to pay for mitigation action. 
Rich countries have a higher ability to invest in reductions than poor ones and can invest more 
in GHG reductions in other countries through offsetting mechanisms. There is no need to 
project GDP/capita over time and one can simply use recent available data, as this indicator 
measures the ability to act today on climate change. 
 
One can measure GDP/capita in current prices or in purchasing power parity (PPP). As most 
clean environmental technologies and services required for large scale investments in a low 
carbon energy infrastructure are traded internationally at world market prices, the GDP/capita 
in current prices reflects more appropriately the availability of the financial resources. 
 
 
4.1.2 "GHG emissions per GDP" scenario 
 
The ratio GHG emissions per unit of GDP, is selected as a second simple indicator that could 
be used to attribute a reduction target to a country. The higher the indicator, the more 
ambitious the reduction target can be. The total emissions a country emits in order to produce 
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its goods and services may indicate whether there is a potential to reduce emissions. Low 
carbon productivity can be attributed either to a carbon intensive energy mix or to a high 
degree of energy inefficiency. These conditions generally offer substantial mitigation 
potential at lower cost than those economies that have a low carbon energy mix or are highly 
energy efficient. GHG/GDP measures the ability to mitigate as of today, and there is no need 
for projections over time, as such recent data can be used for the allocation. 
 
 
4.1.3 "Early action" scenario 
 
The observed GHG emission trend is selected as a third simple indicator that could be used to 
attribute a reduction target to a country. The steeper the reduction was since 1990, the less 
ambitious the future reduction target is set. Since 1992, developed countries have the 
obligation under the UNFCCC to act on climate change. Over the period 1990 to 2005 total 
GHG emissions of the group of these countries has actually declined. But there have been 
huge differences in the country by country performance within this group with large 
reductions in some while others have increased their emissions substantially. By taking early 
action many emission reduction options have already been realised in the past. At the same 
time, taking early action into account provides a reward and an incentive for the future. The 
data used in this assessment are the historic GHG emissions trend over the period 1990-2005, 
excluding the LULUCF sector. 
 
 
4.1.4 "Population growth" scenario 
 
Population trend is, therefore, selected as a fourth simple indicator that could be used to 
attribute a reduction target to a country. The higher the indicator, the less stringent the 
reduction target can be. Countries with an increasing population will face more difficulties to 
reduce their emissions than countries with stable or declining populations, assuming per 
capita income, carbon and energy intensity are all stable. The data used in this assessment are 
the historic population trends over the period 1990-2005. 
 
 
4.1.5 Central scenario 
 
The central scenario21 simultaneously takes into account all four single indicators: 
GDP/capita, GHG/GDP, GHG emission trends and Population trends. Each developed 
country has intermediate targets which lie between the extremes of the single-indicator 
targets. The individual country targets in the central scenario for all developed countries add 
up to -30% emission reduction target in 2020 compared to 1990. The central scenario will be 
analyzed in chapters 5 and 6 with POLES and GEM-E3, respectively.  
 
 
                                                 
21 See Annex 9 of part 2 in European Commission (2009b) for more details on how the central 
scenario is defined. 
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4.2 Action of developing countries 
 
For the developing countries it was assumed that they would also introduce internal actions to 
ensure global emissions are on a pathway stay within the 2ºC objective, i.e. that emission 
growth would be limited to a level of around 20% below baseline emissions in 2020. In order 
to determine the level of action by developing countries in this scenario, similar indicators 
were used as for developed countries. 
 
• GDP per capita, addressing the capacity to pay for emission reduction within a country 
• GHG per GDP, addressing the opportunities to reduce GHG emissions 
• Projected Population trends over the period 2005 – 2020, recognising different 
pressures on the projected emission evolution. 
 
The higher a country's GDP per capita, the more national actions it would need to undertake 
to limit emissions growth compared to baseline. The higher a country's GHG emissions per 
GDP, the more it would need to undertake action to limit emission growth compared to 
baseline. And finally, the higher a county's projected population growth rate up to 2020, the 
less mitigation action it would need to undertake. Summing up the three factors will result in 
the necessary emission limitations below the baseline. 
 
Table 3 gives an overview of the implications of each indicator on the total amount of 
reduction needed compared to baseline in this internal action scenario for China, Brazil and 
India. Brazil being the richest of these three countries would need to limit emissions most 
according to its GDP/Capita. But for Brazil the reverse is true for GHG intensity of its 
economy, where it is one of the better performers. Finally, India has a high population growth 
rate while that of China is very low resulting in a different amount of allowed increase 
compared to baseline. In total, China is expected to reduce more than the other two compared 
to baseline. 
Table 3: Emission reductions for developing countries resulting from the allocation options (in % 
compared to baseline) 
 
 Share 
according 
to GDP/cap 
Share 
according 
to GHG/GDP 
Share according to
Population ’05-‘20 
Total 
Reduction  
Brazil -13.2% 0.0% 3.9% -9% 
China -4.2% -13.0% 1.0% -16% 
India -0.5% -12.2% 4.9% -8% 
 
 
4.3 A gradually developing global carbon market 
 
In the discussions on emission reduction scenarios, the standard reduction cases tend to 
operate with a normative optimisation approach, assuming perfect foresight and perfect 
emission trading. As a consequence there is only one carbon price across all world regions 
and sectors, which leads to minimum cost for compliance with a certain emission reduction 
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target. While this approach can help in understanding the theoretically ideal pathway to reach 
a given target, it is questionable to what extent it represents existing behaviour in the real 
world. 
 
Unlike many earlier scenarios, the scenarios developed in this study no longer assume ideal 
pathways with perfect trading in all sectors across all time periods and world regions. Instead, 
it aims at being more realistic while at the same time maintaining the idea of economic 
efficiency by a gradually developing global carbon market across sectors and countries, 
resulting in different abatement and thus different carbon costs. 
 
Developed countries take on a collective emission reduction target in the range of 30% 
compared to 1990, and they set up a trading system such as the EU ETS or similar policy 
measures that establish a carbon price for the energy intensive industrial sectors, including the 
power sector. A carbon market exists for the sectors included in the EU ETS but it is not 
perfect and thus it does not equalise Marginal Abatement Costs for the involved sectors on a 
global scale. Instead of this, the effective carbon prices are assumed to vary between the 
various regions in the world because of differences in transaction costs (see figure below), 
and they converge over time. Carbon prices are similar across markets in developed countries 
by 2015. Economies in transition follow suit but carbon prices would be equal as of 2020.  
 
Energy intensive sectors in developing countries are exposed to a low carbon price in 2012, 
simulating the limited penetration or visibility of a carbon price for all individual firms 
through policy instruments such as the CDM. However, differences in the carbon prices 
become smaller over time as a result of a strengthened regulatory framework in close 
relationship with the state of development of the economy. Between 2025 and 2030, these 
differences in carbon prices become relatively smaller for all groups of countries apart from 
low income countries.  Figure 2 and Table 4 illustrate the developing carbon market for 
POLES and GEM-E3 respectively. This gradually developing carbon market will increase the 
overall economic costs of achieving the 2ºC objective compared to a scenario that assumes 
perfect trading, but is considered a more realistic representation of the carbon market.  
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Figure 2: Carbon price developments in the global carbon market in POLES22 
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Source: JRC/IPTS, POLES 
 
Transport, agricultural, residential and services sectors do not participate in the global carbon 
market. Developed countries reduce emissions in these sectors through energy efficiency 
improvements, and sector-specific policies. In developing countries, only energy efficiency 
policies in these sectors are implemented. 
 
Table 4: Carbon market penetration in developing countries in 2020 for GEM-E3 (in %) 
 
Brazil 76% China 55% 
Southern Africa 73% India 33% 
Rest of Eastern Asia 72% Rest of Asia 30% 
Rest of Latin 
America 67% 
Middle 
Africa 30% 
Source: JRC/IPTS, GEM-E3 
 
The degree of development of the global carbon market in 2020 is an important factor to 
assess the costs of GHG mitigation. Therefore in Chapter 7 the GEM-E3 model is run to 
compare the costs for mitigation policies with a developing carbon market under two 
extremes, i.e. no global carbon market at all and a perfect global carbon market that equalises 
on a global scale the marginal abatement costs in the sectors involved. 
 
                                                 
22 Breakdown of regions in the reduction scenario: Europe: EU - 27 + Switzerland and Norway; 
Developed Countries: US, Japan, Australia, New Zealand; Economies in transition: Russia + 
Ukraine + Rest of Central Europe; High Income Developing Countries: Gulf states, Mediterranean 
Middle East, South Korea, Mexico; Other Developing: China, Brazil, CIS (excl. Russia and Ukraine), 
South East Asia, North Africa, South America, Turkey, Central America, Former Soviet Union States 
in Asia; Low Income Developing Countries: India, Egypt, Sub Sahara Africa, South Asia. 
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5 The Impact on the Energy Sector (POLES) 
 
In this chapter, POLES model analyses the type of actions/technologies necessary in the 
energy and transport sector to ensure that GHG emissions are limited to be in line with the 
objectives proposed by the EU with respect to the baseline assumptions and conditions. In this 
chapter POLES only analyzes the "central scenario" with intermediate targets combining the 
four "driver" indicators. In chapter 6, the GEM-E3 model not only assesses the economic 
effects of the central scenarios but also of each of the single-indicator scenario described in 
chapter 4. The results analysed in chapter 5 and chapter 6 are under the condition of a 
gradually developing carbon market. Chapter 7 compares these results with the cases without 
carbon market and with a perfect carbon market. 
 
 
5.1 General results of the central scenario 
 
GHG emissions in developed countries decrease by 22% in 2020 compared to 1990 in this 
scenario. The EU27 takes its part from this burden as its domestic GHG emissions decrease 
by 22%. The remaining 10% is achieved through offsetting mechanisms that generate credits 
for reductions in developing countries. GHG emissions of developing countries continue to 
grow up to 2020 and reach a peak between 2020 and 2025, however in 2020, emissions from 
energy and industry in developing countries are 19% below baseline projections (Figure 3:)23. 
 
                                                 
23 See Annex in European Commission (2009b) for more details on impacts of the central 
scenario on selected MEM participants. 
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Figure 3: Country GHG emissions in POLES baseline & central scenarios 
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Figure 4 identifies six main categories for the period 2005-2030 for various geographical 
regions, which are the most important to achieve the emission reductions. These are the 
energy efficiency improvements in the various economic sectors, carbon capture and 
sequestration technologies (CCS), switch to renewables, increase in nuclear, and substitution 
amongst the various fossil fuels. These changes are examined in detail in this section together 
with an in depth analysis of the investment need these changes require in the power 
generation sector. 
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Figure 4: Contribution of different technologies to reduce CO2 emissions 
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5.2 Energy efficiency, a crucial ingredient of the central 
scenario 
 
Until 2020, energy efficiency measures represent the bulk of the reduction potential. Both in 
technical and economical terms it is the single most important opportunity in the coming 
decade.  
 
A large variety of low-cost measures can be used in an early phase, most of which are already 
available and have negative or low costs even though the upfront investments might be 
considerable.  All sectors have potential to improve energy efficiency (both supply and 
demand sectors)24. The POLES model simulates the implementation of energy efficiency 
                                                 
24  Energy efficiency improvements that are not introduced through increases in the carbon 
price, related to the different energy transforming equipments and/or  to the final energy use in 
the industrial, residential and services sectors, are modelled through autonomous energy efficiency 
indicators (AEEIs). For road transport the impact of measures, including standards, on the 
efficiency improvements of the whole transport fleet is modelled in the transport module of the 
POLES model, based by the assessment on their impact on fuel efficiencies of the newly introduced 
vehicles in the future. Estimates are made for the upfront costs of these energy efficiency 
improvements. These are based on studies by JRC for EU energy efficiency measures, a study by 
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policies through a gradual improvement of the global energy intensity. Moreover, the gradual 
introduction of a carbon price at higher levels than the one assumed in the baseline stimulates 
further carbon price-induced energy efficiency improvements. 
 
Figure 5 shows the crucial importance of such induced energy efficiency improvements for 
the overall emission reductions, delivering up to 50% of total global effort compared to 
baseline in 2020 in the industrial sectors and in transport. In 2030 it still accounts for almost 
half the global effort. For developing countries this share is even higher with about 2/3rd of 
the total action coming from energy efficiency. 
 
The energy efficiency improvements are partly driven through the smaller energy price 
differentiation across developed and developing countries and all economies become more or 
less equally exposed to the same energy price changes and volatility. As such, developing 
countries have stronger incentives for the early adoption of innovative energy saving 
technological solutions25.  
 
In power generation, a large potential for cost efficient improvements for various types of 
power plants exists, covering the full spectre from combined cycle gas turbines to 
supercritical coal plants. This potential is very large in both developed and developing 
countries, but particularly interesting in developing countries such as China and India. Among 
developed countries, the US have ample room for efficiency improvements. Moreover, in 
developing countries, the coupling of energy improvements with air pollution abatement 
technologies could also generate significant health benefits26. Important efficiency gains can 
be reaped by improving the overall architecture of the power generation system and of the 
transmission and distribution grid, with effective integration of intermittent power sources 
like renewables or distributed generation like CHP. Smart grids, superconducting electric 
lines, power storage devices ranging from pumping hydro to new generation batteries are the 
crucial technologies to realise these efficiency gains. 
 
Further, the industrial sector is the second most important source for energy efficiency 
improvements. They are potentially very large in emerging economies, especially in those 
where economic growth is accompanied by a fast development of energy intensive industries 
(typically the case of China and other East Asian economies). Faster economic growth also 
fosters rapid capital equipment turnover, opening possibilities for adopting best available 
technologies (BAT) from the international technology market. Their benefits are reinforced 
by the fact that very often BAT deliver not only the most energy efficient performance but 
also considerable co-benefits in terms of reducing air and water pollutants. 
                                                                                                                                                        
Resources for the Future on demand side energy efficiency policies, work for the 2007 US Energy 
Independence and Security Act and other energy efficiency related programs (e.g. Energy Star). 
25 Examples include the shift to secondary iron, steel and non-ferrous metal production or 
substituting materials that are the most energy intensive in the production processes (e.g. 
reducing clinker content in cement, application of inert carbon anodes in aluminium production, or 
simply applying higher recycling rates in paper and glass making, shifting to more sustainable 
building materials and insulation). 
26 See section 6.9 in European Commission (2009b). 
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Comparing the Baseline and the Central scenarios in terms of final energy consumption, the 
latter suggests a balanced effort between sectors, bearing in mind the different technological 
possibilities. At global level, the Central scenario results in 20.4% less global final energy 
consumption compared to the Baseline scenario by 2030. 
 
Figure 5: World Final Energy Consumption for Baseline and Reduction Scenarios 
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Source: JRC/IPTS, POLES 
 
This large potential for efficiency gains in final energy demand can be either driven by policy 
interventions (e.g. setting standards, targeted loan programmes, higher energy prices), which 
lead to technology improvements. The potential for improvements in the residential and 
transport sector are proportionally more important in the EU-27 and in other developed 
countries (at least in the short term), as larger shares of energy consumption in these two 
sectors are typical for wealthy economies. Within the residential and tertiary sector, several 
emerging electric and heating appliances can play a significant role. Compact light bulbs 
offers already a large saving potential (-80%) at virtually zero cost. LEDs, a technology that is 
rapidly becoming available, are likely to offer even larger savings. Intelligent management of 
stand-by electronic appliances also offers substantial savings potential. More efficient electric 
motors and compressors can further improve the performances of washing machines and 
refrigerators. Heat consumption can also be lowered with appropriate building standards and 
the generalised introduction of low temperature solar thermal appliances producing domestic 
hot water and other uses. These technologies will be particularly crucial in those emerging 
countries with a relatively low energy intensity growth path (India, Brazil, etc) but where 
income growth is expected to push up domestic energy consumption. Out of the final 
consumption sectors, the transportation sector provides the best opportunities, via (a) 
improvement in power trains engine efficiency, (b) lowering the weight of engines and cars, 
(c) shifting to less carbon-intensive technologies (e.g. biofuels and electrification), and (d) 
shifting from private to public transport or from road to rail. 
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Figure 6: Sectoral Final Energy Savings compared to Baseline 
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Tertiary sectors are expected to deliver less, especially in developing countries: this will be 
due to counterbalancing income effects as per capita incomes are expected to rise but also due 
to changing social patterns and population dynamics. The figures for the residential and 
services sector are 14.2% and 13.9%, for the world and EU-27, respectively. 
 
The transport sector, even if technologically rigid, can achieve substantial reductions of final 
energy demand between the two scenarios thanks to energy efficiency improvements, a modal 
shift towards more performing electric transportation schemes, and an increased use of public 
transport. In 2030, energy savings from the transport sector are expected to amount in the 
Central scenario to around 20% and 30% compared to the baseline for the world and the EU-
27, respectively. 
 
 
5.3 Renewable energy 
 
Renewable energies are not only carbon free, but they also improve the security of supply 
within energy balances. Most of them are particularly relevant for power production 
(hydropower, on- and off-shore wind power, solar PV, high temperature solar, geothermal, 
different types of biomass-fed power plants, and in perspective geothermal, tidal and wave 
power). They present often zero or very low GHG emissions. They are available at a wide 
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range of development levels, from commercially mature to those that are only at the 
conceptual stage. Particularly innovative are some technologies to improve the performance 
of photovoltaic cells, but also biotechnologies for biofuels or hydrogen production. These still 
need important R&D efforts. Other technologies, close to commercial stage, attempt to 
compete with the conventional technologies, but might need support schemes or a smoothly 
functioning carbon market with a significant carbon price. 
 
The baseline scenario foresees that electricity output from renewables would grow worldwide 
by 148% by 2020 and by 246.8% by 2030 with respect to 1990. Renewables would increase 
by 185.4% by 2020 and by 322.4% by 2030 in the central scenario for the same period, 
showing that climate policies enhance renewables. The potential growth of each technology, 
however, depends on the remaining potential. Hydropower, for instance, offers limited 
expansion capacity in many developed regions, and by 2030 the hydropower output 
differences between the two scenarios are small, around 5% with respect to the reference year 
(that is, an 85.3% increase in the central scenario versus an 80.3% increase in the Baseline). 
By 2030 'new' renewables (mainly wind and to a lesser extent solar) are expected to multiply 
by 24 compared to 1990 levels in the Baseline and multiply by 34 in the Central scenario. 
These changes look impressive but in fact they represent in the baseline scenario a yearly 
growth rate of 8.8% until 2020 and of 8.3% until 2030, and in the Central scenario slightly 
higher yearly growth rates (10.0% until 2020 and 9.2% until 2030). The real acceleration 
takes place in the period 2005-2020, when production increase more than sevenfold in the 
baseline and more than tenfold in the Central scenario. 
 
For the EU renewables growth in power generation would be 272,2% in 2020 and 331.1% in 
2030 with respect to 1990 in the central scenario (against 221% and 310.4% in the baseline 
for the same period). The growth in "new" renewables, excluding hydropower, would have 
rates close to 13.4%/yr to 2020 and 10.6%/yr to 2030 in the central scenario. 
 
Total growth in renewables allows to reach a share of 17% over total primary energy by 2020 
and 18,3% by 2030. They represent respectively 17% in 2020 of total final energy 
consumption27. 
 
Renewables have also an important market niche in non-electric applications. In domestic and 
industrial sectors, low temperature solar thermal devices and biomass-fuelled boilers can be 
used. In the transport sector, bio-ethanol, bio-diesel or other forms of sustainable biofuels are 
also already extensively used in several countries, and in some of them have gained a 
significant market share. Their worldwide potential is significant28. 
                                                 
27  This figure does not include the contribution of heat-pumps in Residential and Services 
surface heating, geothermal, tidal and wave energy. Heat production for local CHP plants based on 
biomass is not considered in the model. If these sources would be incorporated in the calculation, 
the renewables share would increase towards the 20% target. See also the results of the Green-X 
model used for the staff working document accompanying the Renewable Road Map 
Communication on the estimations of the excluded sources (COM 2006/1719).  
28 See European Commission (2009b) for an assessment of the potential impact of biomass and 
biofuels on deforestation and agricultural production. 
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5.4 Nuclear power 
 
Another carbon free energy source is nuclear power. In the baseline, worldwide nuclear power 
sees a 40.6% capacity increase and a 40.1% output increase over the period 2005-2020. This 
is higher than in the 2007 Impact Assessment29 due to higher overall fossil fuel prices. In the 
Central scenario more nuclear power capacity is added, with an 80.9% increase of installed 
capacity and an 80.5% increase in output by 2020 compared to 2005. Over half of total 
additional capacity would be installed in developing countries. In the EU, capacity is roughly 
maintained in 2020 at 2005 levels in both scenarios in line with current phase-out plans in 
Member States. 
 
 
5.5 Fuel switch 
 
Fuel switch not only entails a change to less carbon-intensive fuels but may also lead to 
additional gains in efficiency as the switch implies a substantial change in technology (e.g. 
replacing oil-fired boilers with advanced high-efficient gas turbines). However, this is not 
always the case, since some standard combustion plants can accommodate a range of fuels 
from highly carbon intensive coal to virtually zero-carbon biomass. At a global scale, the 
power generation sector is the one that would show most of the fuel switch in the projected 
period due to its relatively high technological flexibility. 
 
Interestingly, the upward trend in the demand for electricity is much higher compared to the 
projected increase in overall final energy demand, i.e. the share of electricity will increase. 
Electricity will continue to be the most valued and demanded final energy carrier, and even in 
the Central scenario total global electricity demand grows by 160% by 2030 with respect to 
the 1990 level. However, the technological portfolio is expected to radically change: carbon-
free primary electricity is supposed to account for around 55-56% of total electricity produced 
by 2030 (both worldwide and in EU-27) in the Central scenario, whereas in the baseline this 
share is expected to reach a mere 33.6% worldwide and 47,7% in the EU. 
 
 
                                                 
29 Impact assessment accompanying the Communication "Limiting Global Climate Change to 
2 degrees Celsius The way ahead for 2020 and beyond". 
  
 
 The Im
pact on the Energy S
ector (PO
LES
) 
33
JJ RR
CC
RR
ee pp oo rr tt
Figure 7: Power Generation by fuel type 
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Source: JRC/IPTS, POLES 
 
It should be noted that since 1990 the share of carbon free electricity produced globally has 
dropped significantly. This is due to the massive growth in fossil fuel power generation 
capacity (particularly coal-fired), and to the slowdown or outright halt of nuclear programmes 
worldwide over the last two decades. The Central scenario will take the world back in terms 
of share of carbon free electricity almost exactly to the share as it stood in 1990, but on the 
scale, which is 3.5 times bigger than in 1990. 
 
 
5.6 Carbon capture and storage 
 
From the point of view of new technologies, a significant contribution to emission reductions 
is expected from carbon capture and storage (CCS): in fact a very fast deployment of this 
technology would be necessary from the very low current levels to those projected for 2030 in 
the Central scenario. This technology is already being used especially in the context of 
enhanced oil recovery and natural gas production but the marginal costs for retrofit 
applications is still significantly higher than prevailing carbon prices. Furthermore, the 
environmental impact of large scale deployment of this technology in the power sector over 
long periods is largely unknown. The environmentally sound and safe deployment of this 
technology requires a sound legal framework like the one that has been adopted by the 
European Union. 
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Unsurprisingly, at global level, in the Baseline, the penetration of CCS with respect to fossil-
fuelled power plants by 2030 is virtually zero, whereas the Central scenario results in a 
significant share (18%) of fossil fuel power generation with CCS (Figure 8). This underlines 
how crucial this technology will be in the future to achieve a sustainable carbon emission path 
at global level, and that large scale demonstration has to take off without delay. The greatest 
potential for expansion of this technology is anticipated to take place in the US and in China, 
while it would be relatively smaller in the EU. Most new fossil fuel power plants built after 
2020 would be with CCS. 
 
Figure 8: Share of power sector emissions captured through Carbon Capture and Storage 
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Source: JRC/IPTS, POLES 
 
 
5.7 Investment needs in the power sector 
 
The Central scenario implies an accelerated decommissioning of carbon-intensive 
technologies and its replacement by low-carbon, climate-friendly ones. The latter typically 
exhibit higher investment costs, therefore higher investment flows are required. However, 
while the costs of single investments are higher, a carbon constrained world also entails more 
efficient end-use of energy and therefore a lower total final energy demand requiring less 
power plants overall. This affects all final energy carriers, but most especially the power 
generation sector, which is the one expected to contribute a significant share to the overall 
decarbonisation of the energy sector. The annual investment in newly installed capacities for 
the power sector (26 power generation technologies are considered) is shown in Figure 9 for 
both scenarios until 2030. For CCS installations, this investment cost includes the costs to 
capture CO2 but not to transport and store it. As such total investments including CCS might 
be higher in 2030 due to a large penetration of CCS by then. 
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Figure 9: Annual Power Generation Investments 
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Source: JRC/IPTS, POLES 
 
The results indicate that the differences in costs within the power generation sector are not 
very high because efficiency gains are projected to offset higher specific capital investment 
costs. 
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Figure 10: Changes in the mix of power generation 
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Source: JRC/IPTS, POLES 
 
The main changes in generation capacity (Figure 10) between the Central scenario and the 
baseline would concern the thermal-electric power from fossil fuels: worldwide it would 
decrease by around 41% in the Central scenario by 2030, but the impact until 2020 would be 
much smaller. This trend is particularly obvious in China, India and the US. But the losses of 
fossil fuelled generation capacity would be to a large extent substituted by increases in 
renewables and nuclear capacity. Additional capacity in developed countries would be 
provided mainly by new renewables and hydro. Nuclear would also grow in all regions. 
 
Considering the new capacity additions the changes are significant (Figure 11). Conventional 
fossil based technologies represents less than a fifth of the new capacity additions by 2030, a 
ratio which stands between 66% and 85 % at present. While electricity generation would 
require the installation of much less capacities indicated by these figures, they are made in 
technologies (nuclear and renewables) characterised with higher unit investment costs. While 
the total investment cost does not reduce, the dependency on imported fossil fuels reduces 
substantially. 
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Figure 11: Additional, new capacity in Power generation compared to 2000 
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Source: JRC/IPTS, POLES 
 
 
5.8 Sectoral contributions to the central scenario 
 
The structure of energy-based and industrial GHG emissions provides an insight on the 
different opportunities of emission cuts by sectors (Figure 12). More than half of the potential 
emission cuts are to be found within the power generation sector. This reflects the great 
potential of this sector to shift to less carbon intensive technology portfolio combined with the 
possible reductions on the demand side. On the second place comes the industrial sector, 
where significant opportunities can be found as well. This emission reduction potential is 
particularly important in developing countries, so that the power generation and industrial 
sectors in these economies appear to be the key sectors for GHG abatement actions in the 
future international agreement. 
 
Sectors like residential and transport exhibit lower rates of technological change as private 
persons might lack sufficient cash to purchase energy efficient goods at optimal levels due to 
sometimes high upfront investments (e.g. energy efficient household equipments or better 
thermal insulation of houses). 
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Figure 12: GHG reductions per sector, World Regions 
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5.9 Costs associated with the actions in the energy 
system and the industrial sectors 
 
The real incremental mitigation costs that are experienced within an economy induced 
through carbon prices and the upfront investments necessary to achieve energy efficiency 
measures are estimated by the POLES model and can be found in Table 5. They do not 
include the financial flows generated by the trade in emission reduction credits, even though 
developed countries only reduce by around -22% by 2020 compared to 1990 so around 8% 
further reductions would have to be achieved through acquisition of credits through the use of 
offsetting mechanisms. 
 
The annual global reduction costs in the year 2020 amount to € 152 billion by 202030. Over 
the whole period 2013-2020 cumulative global costs are equal to € 666 billion. Costs in 
developed countries are equal to € 81 billion in 2020 or € 374 billion cumulated over the 
period 2013-2020. Costs in developing countries are equal to € 71 billion in 2020 or € 292 
billion over the period 2013-2020. 
                                                 
30 The abatement cost rise to € 175 billion if costs in agriculture and avoided deforestation are 
considered. 
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Table 5: Costs in developed and developing countries and trade in emissions rights 
 
Cost of reductions in CO2 from energy and Non CO2 emissions from industry  
Costs in the year 2020 Total costs over the period 2013 – 2020  
Total costs in Billion € (2005 prices) Total costs in Billion € (2005 prices) 
 (a) (c) 
World 152 666 
Developed countries 81 374 
Developing countries 71 292 
EU 23 126 
USA 34 157 
Japan 7 30 
Russia 7 22 
China 30 109 
Brazil 3 14 
India 5 24 
Source: JRC/IPTS, POLES 
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6 Economic Implications (GEM-E3) 
 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, the POLES model analysis was complemented by the assessment 
of the reduction scenario with the multi-sectoral computable general equilibrium model 
GEM-E3. The two models are complementary: while POLES is a partial equilibrium model 
focussed on the global energy system, GEM-E3 is better suited to analyze the interactions 
between all the sectors in the economy and between regions through the international trade 
flows. The partial equilibrium energy model calculates the direct cost of the carbon reduction 
policy in the energy sector. In a general equilibrium framework, the direct impact of the 
climate policy on the energy sector is taken into account but also the indirect impact and cost 
on all other sectors and agents of the economy. GDP can be used as a measure of the overall 
macroeconomic adjustment to meet the emission target.  
 
6.1 Assumptions 
 
Comparability of efforts of developed countries is one major issue in the current negotiations. 
Therefore, the economic impacts of the various options for sharing the effort between 
developed countries were assessed with the help of the GEM-E3 model. All GEM-E3 
emission reduction scenarios respect the following assumptions: 
 
• Developed countries take on a combined reduction commitment of 30% below 1990 
levels by 2020. 
• Developed countries set up a cap and trade system for the sectors which are at present in 
the EU ETS, equalising the carbon price in these sectors among developed countries.  
• Developing countries undertake nationally appropriate actions themselves in sectors 
belonging to the ETS, as well as belonging to the non-ETS. 
• Developed countries also have access to the global carbon market including carbon 
credits from developing countries. It is assumed that the use of the offsetting 
mechanisms is limited to the sectors which are typically part of the EU ETS.  
 
However, this global carbon market is not perfect but has significant transaction costs in 
transactions with developing countries. This means that the developing countries offer fewer 
reduction credits to the global carbon market than they would do without transaction costs. As 
a consequence, carbon prices in each of the developing countries remain below those in 
developed countries. 
 
Developing countries introduce policies over time allowing them to overcome these 
transaction costs and participate gradually in the global carbon market. The richer a 
developing country is the more advanced its policies/mechanisms are, and the lower the 
transaction costs. Hence, its carbon price gets closer to the one in the ETS markets of 
developed countries. 
 
6.2 Four single-indicator scenarios 
 
On the basis of recent UNFCCC emission data for the year 2005, developed countries need to 
reduce their emissions as group by about 27% between 2005 and 2020 in order to meet the 
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EU's proposed 30% reduction target compared to 1990. In the following analysis the 
necessary effort is shared among developed countries according to the four single-indicator 
scenarios indentified in Chapter 4. Table 6 gives an overview of these options for the main 
developed countries. 
 
Table 6: Key indicators of the four options for allocating the mitigation efforts among developed countries 
 GDP per capita 
in 1000€, 2005a 
GHG/GDP, 2005, 
in kg of CO2 
per US$(2000)b 
GHG trend 1990 
to 2005 
%c 
Population trend 
1990 to 2005 
%d 
EU27 22.5 0.43 -8 +4.0 
Australia 28.1 0.80 +27 +20.4 
Canada 28.3 0.67 +25 +16.5 
Iceland 43.7 0.21 +11 +16.1 
Japan 28.7 0.24 +7 +3.5 
New Zealand 21.2 0.56 +25 +20.1 
Norway 52.8 0.20 +9 +9.4 
Russia 4.3 4.41 -29 -3.1 
Switzerland 41.3 0.17 +2 +8.6 
Ukraine 1.5 6.56 -55 -9.0 
USA 33.8 0.53 +16 +17.1 
a Adapted from World Bank and Eurostat 
b Data from IEA2007 
c Data database UNFCCC website 
d UN population data 
 
The allocation option that leads to the least economic impact for the group of developed 
countries is the one that uses GHG intensity of the economy, but this is also the one that has 
the relatively most negative impact on the Commonwealth of Independent States reflecting 
the very high mitigation potential but relative low GDP (Table 7). 
 
If one looks at the impact on welfare31, US, Canada and Australia & New Zealand all would 
favour population trend as the preferred option to allocate targets, whereas the EU, Japan and 
Other OECD Europe would prefer the option based on the GHG intensity of the economy. 
Welfare in the Commonwealth of Independent States could even increase if targets were set 
only in accordance with the option using early action or GDP/capita. Europe would be faced 
with the highest economic impacts with the option using population trends as the sole 
indicator. USA, Japan and Other OECD Europe would incur highest welfare losses when 
using GDP/capita. 
 
                                                 
31 Note that in the GEM-E3 model the consumers optimise their welfare (which is a function of 
Private consumption and leisure), whereas firms maximize their profits. GDP as such is not 
optimised; it results from the interaction between firms, consumers, the public sector, and the 
external sector. 
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Relative impacts on GDP are very similar to the relative impact on overall welfare. Note that 
GDP decreases in the Commonwealth of Independent States, even when early action or 
GDP/capita is used as the indicator to establish the targets while economic welfare increases. 
The reason is that the Commonwealth of Independent States becomes a net seller in the 
carbon market, and uses the revenue rather for extra consumption than for investments that 
would increase GDP growth. For employment and private consumption similar relative 
differences can be noted. 
 
Some of the single-indicator scenarios have large differences in emission targets across 
developed countries resulting in very large differences in the economic impact. Most notably, 
the indicators for GHG intensity in the economy or population trends lead to very ambitious 
targets for the Commonwealth of Independent States, and their respective impacts become 
unacceptably high. Similarly, GDP per capita leads to very high impacts for Other OECD 
Europe. The same is true to a lesser extent for Canada using the early action indicator. 
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Table 7: Results for 4 indicators and the related targets for developed countries 
Change in 2020 compared to baseline 
Impact on economic welfare if targets are based on: 
 GDP/Cap GHG/GDP Early action Population trends 
EU27 -1.6% -1.1% -1.3% -2.6% 
USA -1.2% -0.5% -1.0% -0.3% 
Japan -1.0% -0.1% -0.9% -0.9% 
Canada -2.2% -1.6% -3.1% -0.8% 
Australia & New Zealand -1.8% -1.7% -2.6% -0.7% 
Other OECD Europe -5.7% -0.5% -1.9% -1.5% 
Commonwealth of Independent States 1.2% -8.5% 0.8% -7.7% 
Average Developed countries -1.3% -0.9% -1.1% -1.4% 
Impact on GDP if targets are based on: 
 GDP/Cap GHG/GDP Early action Population trends 
EU27 -1.5% -1.0% -1.3% -2.1% 
USA -1.2% -0.5% -1.0% -0.5% 
Japan -1.0% -0.2% -0.9% -0.9% 
Canada -2.0% -1.5% -2.7% -0.9% 
Australia & New Zealand -2.0% -1.8% -2.8% -1.0% 
Other OECD Europe -4.8% -0.3% -1.3% -1.0% 
Commonwealth of Independent States -2.6% -7.3% -2.5% -6.6% 
Average Developed countries -1.4% -0.8% -1.2% -1.2% 
Impact on employment if targets are based on: 
 GDP/Cap GHG/GDP Early action Population trends 
EU27 -0.4% -0.4% -0.4% -0.7% 
USA -0.5% -0.3% -0.4% -0.2% 
Japan -0.4% -0.1% -0.4% -0.4% 
Canada -0.7% -0.6% -0.9% -0.4% 
Australia & New Zealand -0.7% -0.8% -1.1% -0.4% 
Other OECD Europe -1.8% 0.1% -0.2% -0.2% 
Commonwealth of Independent States -1.6% -2.2% -1.5% -1.9% 
Average Developed countries -0.7% -0.7% -0.7% -0.8% 
Impact on private consumption if targets are based on: 
 GDP/Cap GHG/GDP Early action Population trends 
EU27 -2.1% -1.4% -1.8% -3.3% 
USA -1.9% -0.8% -1.6% -0.6% 
Japan -1.6% -0.3% -1.5% -1.5% 
Canada -3.4% -2.5% -4.7% -1.3% 
Australia & New Zealand -3.0% -2.8% -4.3% -1.3% 
Other OECD Europe -8.3% -0.6% -2.5% -2.1% 
Commonwealth of Independent States -0.2% -12.5% -0.7% -11.2% 
Average Developed countries -2.1% -1.2% -1.8% -1.8% 
 Source: JRC/IPTS, GEM-E3 
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6.3 Central scenario 
 
Chapter 4 shows the mitigation targets for the central scenario. Table 8 reports on the 
economic impacts of the central scenario for each region. 
 
For every country, impacts are between the extremes of impacts of the policy scenarios based 
on single indicators (see Table 7). Overall impacts for the group of developed countries are 
very close to the outcome when GHG intensity would have been used as an indicator. 
 
 
Table 8: Economic Impacts resulting from the central scenario in 2020 
 
Change compared to baseline 
Target vs 
2005 
Economic 
Welfare 
GDP Employment 
Private 
consumption 
EU27 -24% -1.4% -1.2% -0.4% -1.8% 
USA -34% -0.7% -0.8% -0.4% -1.2% 
Japan -29% -0.6% -0.6% -0.3% -1.0% 
Canada -39% -2.2% -2.0% -0.7% -3.4% 
Australia & New Zealand -38% -1.9% -2.0% -0.8% -3.2% 
Other OECD Europe -30% -1.5% -1.0% -0.1% -2.0% 
Commonwealth of Independent States -12% -1.4% -3.0% -1.5% -3.4% 
Average Developed Countries -27% -1.0% -1.0% -0.6% -1.5% 
Source: JRC/IPTS, GEM-E3 
 
Impacts on welfare are highest for Canada and Australia & New Zealand who have also the 
highest targets compared to 2005. The Commonwealth of Independent States has also a 
relatively high impact, particularly for GDP, even with relatively low targets compared to the 
rest of the group. The Commonwealth of Independent States still has a relatively low GDP, so 
even low absolute costs have relatively higher impacts than in the richer countries. 
Importantly, in the countries where the economic impact looks relatively high compared to 
baseline in 2020, growth rates are also higher and thus impacts appear less significant when 
compared in terms of overall GDP growth over the period 2001- 2020 (Table 9). 
 
The US and Japan face the lowest economic impacts (Table 8). For Japan this is partly due to 
the fact that it has a very low GHG intensity per GDP. So even if marginal costs are relatively 
high per ton of CO2 reduced, total costs are small compared to GDP. The US has a similar 
GHG/GDP intensity as EU-27 in 2020. However, the domestic production and exports of 
energy intensive products is higher in the EU-27 than in the US. 
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Table 9: Impact on growth over the period 2001-2020 
 
Growth in GDP over period 2001-2020 
  In Baseline In Target case 
EU27 38.9% 37.2% 
USA 51.8% 50.6% 
Japan 37.5% 36.6% 
Canada 55.1% 52.0% 
Australia & New Zealand 61.8% 58.5% 
Other OECD Europe 38.1% 36.7% 
Commonwealth of Independent States 99.7% 93.7% 
Source: JRC/IPTS, GEM-E3 
Concerning Canada, Australia & New Zealand, these countries face higher impacts because 
their GHG emissions/GDP and energy consumption/GDP shares are rather high compared to 
the rest of developed countries. Furthermore, domestic production and exports of energy 
intensive industrial products are higher in Canada, Australia & New Zealand leading to higher 
macro-economic costs. 
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7 The Role of the Global Carbon Market 
 
The carbon market has a crucial role to play in order to implement the climate policies in a 
cost-efficient way. It is not only a market for a number of energy-intensive industries in the 
developed world, but it also links the climate policies in the developed and developing world. 
The offsetting mechanisms are limited to the sectors which are typically part of the EU ETS. 
In chapters 5 and 6, it was assumed that the global carbon market is imperfect as there are 
significant transaction costs in the transactions with developing countries. As a consequence 
the developing countries are unable to sell the full potential of their carbon credits given the 
carbon price. 
 
This chapter analyses the sensitivity of the economic effects in the central case with respect to 
the degree of development of the global carbon market. Three cases are distinguished: 
 
Case 1: Imperfect global carbon market  
This is the standard approach as is used in chapters 5 and 6. GHG emissions in developed 
countries decrease by about 20% compared to 1990 by 2020. The remaining reductions of 
their -30% target are achieved through offsetting mechanisms in the global carbon market. 
 
Case 2: No global carbon market 
The developed countries reach the -30% target completely domestically. 
 
Case 3: Perfect global carbon market 
There is a global carbon market encompassing all sectors in both developed and developing 
world. This ensures that there is a single equalised carbon price (in all sectors and all 
countries), assuming there are no transaction costs32. 
 
 
7.1 Carbon market in POLES 
 
The "Central scenario" with a gradually developing carbon market (see chapter 5) was 
analysed in order to assess the trade flows of the emissions credits. Economy-wide mid-term 
targets (QELROs) were allocated to developed countries, creating a demand for emission 
reduction credits from developing countries. 
 
Table 10 shows the targets (2nd column), domestically realised emissions reductions (3rd 
column) and the carbon credit purchases (4th column) in the developed countries, as well as 
the domestically realised emission reductions (5th column) and carbon credit sales (6th 
column) in the developing countries for the central scenario with a gradually developing 
carbon market. 
                                                 
32 Note that in the baseline already a carbon price is included in the EU and other developed 
countries. It is assumed that this carbon price is not lowered, even if in a optimal global perfect 
carbon market prices would go below these carbon prices assumed already in baseline. 
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Table 10: Reductions in developed and developing countries and trade in emissions rights 
 
 2020 target 
vs 1990 
emissions 
Achieved 
domestic 
reduction in 
2020 vs 1990 
emissions 
Amount bought (+) 
or sold (-) in 2020 
via the carbon 
market as a % of 
1990 emissions 
Reduction in 
2020 vs 
baseline 
emissions 
Amount sold 
via carbon 
market as % of 
baseline 
emissions 
Developed 
countries -31% -22% 9%   
EU -30% -20% 10%   
USA -24% -9% 15%   
Japan -24% -6% 18%   
Russia -38% -46% -8%   
Developing 
countries    -19% -6% 
China    -20% -6% 
Brazil    -20% -6% 
India    -13% -4% 
 
Source: JRC/IPTS, POLES 
 
In the central scenario, developed countries would decrease their domestic emissions by 22% 
compared to 1990 and thus need to acquire an amount of emission credits which is equal to 
9% of their 1990 emissions. Developing countries reduce their emissions compared to 
baseline by 19%, of which 6% can be sold through the carbon market33. This means that still 
13% of reductions in developing countries would need to come from domestic measures. 
Around two third of this 13% can be achieved through measures at low carbon value or even 
negative costs ('win-win') in the short to mid term. 
 
Carbon prices for the ETS-type of sectors in developed countries range from 72 €/tCO2 in 
case of the need to achieve the 30% internally (no global carbon market) to 22 €/tCO2 in the 
case of a perfect global carbon market, with 44.5 €/tCO2 as a price level in case of the 
imperfect carbon market. 
 
Table 11 gives an overview of direct mitigation costs of climate policy of the major economic 
regions and key countries for the three cases of carbon market. It is important to see that these 
total mitigation costs are different from the financial transfers due to trade flows in emission 
rights.  
 
Columns (a) to (c) in Table 11 give the projected internal reduction cost experienced in 2020 
while columns (d) to (f) give the cumulative costs over the period 2013 to 2020. Costs on a 
global scale are lowest for the option of the perfect carbon market. But also in the imperfect 
                                                 
33 6% of 2020 baseline emissions of developing countries is equal to 8% of 1990 emissions in 
developed countries. 
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carbon market scenario, costs are substantially lower compared to the case where developed 
countries achieve all of the -30% domestically. 
 
Table 11: Costs of the various carbon markets, POLES 
  
Total costs 2020 (Billion €, 
2005 prices) 
Total costs period 2013-2020 
(Billion €, 2005 prices) 
  
No 
global 
carbon 
market 
Imperfect 
global 
carbon 
market 
Perfect 
global 
carbon 
market 
No 
global 
carbon 
market 
Imperfect 
global 
carbon 
market 
Perfect 
global 
carbon 
market 
  (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) 
World 213 152 113 996 666 500 
Developed 
countries 
166 81 39 755 374 179 
Developing 
countries 
48 71 75 241 292 321 
EU 47 23 12 249 126 66 
USA  68 34 16 318 157 72 
Japan  15 7 3 60 30 13 
Russia  17 7 3 51 22 12 
China  18 30 30 86 109 121 
Brazil  2 3 3 11 14 15 
India  5 5 8 23 24 34 
 
Source: JRC/IPTS, POLES 
 
Table 11 clearly confirms that a gradually developing carbon market reduces global reduction 
costs substantially. But in order to estimate overall costs per region, both mitigation costs of 
reducing emissions from energy and non-CO2 in industry (see table above) and potential costs 
and revenues related to trade flows in the carbon market need to be taken into account. 
 
Table 12 gives an overview of the costs incurred by different key countries. The first column 
represents the domestic reduction costs, while the second takes into account any additional 
costs from acquiring emissions credits on the carbon market or revenues from selling 
emission credits on the carbon market. 
 
The transfers on the carbon market are € 51 billion in total, including trade between 
developed countries. Trade between developed and developing represents € 38 billion. 
Developed countries benefit substantially from this trade with developing countries. Even 
though the acquisition of the credits costs them € 38 billion, their mitigation costs diminishes 
by € 85 billion, from € 166 billion in case of no global trade to 81 € billion in case of global 
trade (see Table 11). This represents a net gain of € 47 billion. 
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Table 12: Costs in developed and developing countries and trade in emissions rights 
 
 
Average annual cost of reductions in CO2 from energy 
and Non CO2 emissions from industry in 2020 (Total 
costs in Billion € (2005 prices) 
 
Not taking into account 
revenues or expenditure 
for carbon trade in 2020 
Taking into account 
revenues or expenditure 
for carbon trade in 2020 
World 152 152 
Developed countries 81 119 
Developing countries 71 33 
EU 23 37 
USA 34 57 
Japan 7 13 
Russia 7 -3 
China 30 12 
Brazil 3 2 
India 5 4 
 
Source: JRC/IPTS, POLES 
 
In the scenario with no global market at all, it was assumed that developed countries reach 
their -30% target and developing countries would also undertake appropriate own actions that 
would see global emissions in line with a 2°C scenario34. The cost of this appropriate action is 
equal to € 48 billion in developing countries (Table 11). The gradual introduction of a carbon 
market in developing countries is assumed to pay only for offsetting for those credits that are 
generated for emissions beyond the appropriate action. The price is assumed to be equal to the 
highest experienced marginal abatement cost within the developing country's region that is 
selling credits, which is still below the carbon price in developed countries. 
 
These offsetting mechanisms lead to further emission reductions in developing countries, 
consequently increasing the costs in developing countries from € 48 billion to € 71 billion. 
But for this cost increase of € 23 billion, developing countries receive revenues worth € 38 
billion. In this way, emissions trading create a significant rent of € 15 billion over and above 
the emission reduction costs. This rent can be used to pay also partly for the costs of the 
appropriate own action which is estimated to amount to € 48 billion. Subtracting the rent only 
around € 33 billion will have to be paid for by developing countries themselves or through 
other additional support mechanisms. 
 
 
 
                                                 
34 Assuming that action on REDD and agriculture is also undertaken as described in European 
Commission (2009b), leading to a deviation from baseline in total between 15 and 30%. 
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This is a very important positive consequence of a well designed gradual carbon market. 
Future offsetting mechanisms should ensure that it only compensates for those reductions that 
are not 'low or negative' cost. In addition, it needs to go well beyond mere crediting of offsets 
compared to baseline, ensuring that the mechanism recycles rents from the trade in order to 
compensate for those emission reductions that do not generate credits. 
 
 
7.2 Carbon market in GEM-E3 
 
The GEM E3 model has been also run to assesses the macro-economic costs of climate policy 
according to the different degrees of development of the global carbon market. The target 
used for developed countries and developing countries correspond to those of the "central 
case". 
 
Table 13 shows clearly for the three cases the role of a carbon market for welfare and GDP. 
As expected, global welfare losses are lower for the case of perfect market than the no-global 
trade case. This result applies also on a country-by-country basis: welfare is always higher 
with a perfect global carbon market than in the no global carbon market case. The gradually 
developing carbon market has an intermediate outcome. 
 
For the GDP, however, the outcome is mixed. In general, the world GDP is better off with a 
perfect global carbon market, but this result does not apply on a country-by-country basis. 
Indeed, with a perfect global carbon market the GDP of the developed countries is the 
highest, whereas the developing countries have a higher GDP with no global carbon market. 
The main reason for this is related to the capital formation process.  Due to the transfer of 
credits, consumers in developing countries receive a higher income which they decide to 
spend more-than-proportionally on consumption and leisure, and less-than-proportionally on 
capital investments. This maximizes welfare, but does not promote GDP growth. As a 
consequence, one expects that in these countries GDP would drop more than welfare. The 
opposite interpretation can be made for developed countries, where, in relative terms, welfare 
drops more than GDP. In this case, a consumption and leisure reduction is required to carry 
out substantial investments in energy-intensive sectors and to finance the purchase of 
emission permits in international markets: therefore consumption (and welfare) drops more 
than investment (and GDP), and this effect is more pronounced the more perfect international 
carbon markets are.  
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Table 13: Welfare and GDP effects of the various carbon markets, GEM E3 
 
 Welfare compared to baseline GDP compared to baseline 
2020 
Perfect 
market 
Imperfect 
market 
No 
global 
market 
Perfect 
market 
Imperfect 
market 
No 
global 
market 
EU27 -0.7% -1.4% -1.4% -0.4% -1.2% -1.5% 
USA -0.5% -0.7% -0.7% -0.4% -0.8% -1.0% 
Japan -0.3% -0.6% -0.6% -0.3% -0.6% -0.7% 
CIS -1.3% -1.4% -1.7% -2.7% -3.0% -2.1% 
China 0.5% 0.3% -0.2% -1.4% -0.8% -0.5% 
Brazil 0.0% -0.1% -0.2% -0.5% -0.4% -0.2% 
India 0.1% -0.2% -0.4% -1.4% -0.5% -0.5% 
World -0.3% -0.7% -0.8% -0.5% -0.9% -1.0% 
 
GHG Emissions compared to 
baseline 
GHG Emissions compared to 
1990 
2020 
Perfect 
market 
Imperfect 
market  
No 
market 
Perfect 
market 
Imperfect 
market  
No 
market 
EU27 -6.3% -20.9% -25.3% -8.5% -22.8% -27.1% 
USA -20.9% -31.6% -37.7% -1.0% -14.3% -22.0% 
Japan -14.8% -23.9% -31.0% -7.4% -17.3% -25.0% 
CIS -24.9% -26.1% -20.4% -46.7% -47.5% -43.5% 
China -32.9% -20.8% -16.2% 70.3% 100.9% 112.6% 
Brazil -18.8% -12.3% -9.3% 80.7% 95.2% 102.0% 
India -23.5% -10.7% -7.8% 143.1% 183.6% 192.9% 
World -21.4% -21.4% -21.4% 18.3% 18.3% 18.3% 
Source: JRC/IPTS, GEM-E3 
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Annexes 
POLES regions 
 
47 countries / 
regions 
  
   
NOAM  North America  
 USA  United States  
 CAN Canada  
   
CSAM  Central and South America 
 MEX Mexico  
 RCAM Rest of Central America 
 BRA Brazil  
 RSAM Rest of South America 
   
WEUR  Western Europe  
 RFA Germany  
 FRA France  
 ITA Italy  
 GBR Great Britain  
 ESP Spain  
 GRC Greece  
 PRT Portugal  
 AUT Austria 
 BLX Belgium+ Luxembourg 
 DNK Denmark 
 FIN Finland  
 IRL Ireland  
 NDL the Netherlands 
 SWE Sweden  
 TUR Turkey  
 ROWE Other Western Europe 
   
CEUR  Central Europe 
 POL Poland 
 HUN, Hungary 
 RCZ Czech Republic 
 RSL Slovak Republic 
 ROM Romania 
 BGR Bulgaria 
 SMC Slovenia, Malta, Cyprus 
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 BLT Baltic Region 
 RCEU Rest of Central Europe 
   
FSUN  Former Soviet Union 
 RUS Russia  
 UKR Ukraine  
 RIS Rest of former Soviet Union 
MEMA  North Africa - Middle East 
 NOAP Algeria, Libya 
 NOAN Morocco, Tunisia 
 EGY Egypt  
 MEME Near East 
 GULF Middle East  
  SSAF SSAF   South of Sahara Africa 
SOAS  South Asia  
 NDE India  
 RSAS Rest of South Asia 
SEAS  South East Asia  
 COR Korea  
 RSEA Rest of South East Asia 
COAS  Continental Asia 
 CHN China 
JANZ  Japan – Australasia 
 JPN Japan 
 RJAN Australasia 
 
Figure 13:  POLES regions 
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Baseline Scenario - European Union EU27
2005 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
Indicators
GDP (M€ PPP) 10297.0 11282.8 14018.3 16442.7 18694.7 21198.8
Population (Mcap) 490.8 495.6 498.8 496.5 489.9 479.9
GDP per capita (€/cap) 20978.7 22764.9 28102.6 33114.7 38162.6 44176.2
Gross inland consumption per capita (toe/cap) 3707.6 3850.3 4252.2 4624.0 5057.0 5517.3
Gross inland consumption/GDP (toe/€) 176.7 169.1 151.3 139.6 132.5 124.9
CO2/Gross inland consumption (tCO2/toe) 2319.2 2263.9 2118.1 1938.9 1809.1 1645.2
Gross inland consumption
Natural gas (Mtoe) 443.0 431.6 582.0 616.7 655.8 662.7
Oil (Mtoe) 669.1 669.6 692.8 670.7 641.2 604.5
Coal (Mtoe) 323.2 364.1 324.1 343.6 395.7 435.8
Nuclear (Mtoe) 259.7 255.7 254.4 313.9 353.0 432.2
Other (Mtoe) 124.7 187.3 267.8 351.1 431.5 512.4
Total 1819.8 1908.3 2121.1 2296.0 2477.3 2647.6
Electricity generation
Fuel input for power generation
Natural gas (Mtoe) 126.9 140.0 238.3 256.3 282.5 288.7
Oil (Mtoe) 33.8 26.8 15.1 10.5 10.2 9.2
Coal (Mtoe) 238.6 262.8 245.4 270.9 321.8 357.8
Nuclear (Mtoe) 259.7 255.7 254.4 313.9 353.0 432.2
Others (Biomass) (Mtoe) 28.5 28.5 58.7 75.1 84.8 93.7
Total 687.5 713.7 812.0 926.7 1052.3 1181.6
Net generation capacities
Natural gas (GW) 154.3 180.0 263.7 317.9 341.4 344.2
Oil (GW) 58.4 51.7 38.1 26.9 19.2 14.0
Coal (GW) 184.7 190.1 195.3 231.9 261.8 291.0
Nuclear (GW) 137.6 134.4 136.9 169.2 189.0 228.7
Hydro (GW) 131.7 133.1 135.4 137.1 138.1 138.9
Renewables (GW) 196.1 224.6 305.1 402.6 502.6 630.7
Total 862.8 913.9 1074.5 1285.6 1452.1 1647.5
Net electricity generation
Natural gas (TWh) 646.2 662.6 1225.4 1317.4 1400.2 1337.6
Oil (TWh) 144.0 109.3 62.8 44.5 43.3 39.8
Coal (TWh) 966.3 1010.7 1073.9 1304.7 1604.8 1842.9
Nuclear (TWh) 996.8 981.3 976.2 1204.6 1354.8 1658.7
Hydro (TWh) 302.0 450.8 460.2 464.3 465.7 466.6
Renewables (TWh) 499.3 693.5 966.2 1235.4 1490.5 1794.9
Total 3554.6 3908.2 4764.7 5570.9 6359.3 7140.5
Final Energy Demand
Demand of fuel by sectors
Industry 449.3 456.7 513.2 554.4 609.0 657.6
Commercial and households 456.5 426.2 472.1 505.1 531.4 556.9
Transport 387.1 403.4 447.4 458.7 460.1 458.1
Agriculture 29.6 30.8 35.3 39.9 43.8 47.8
Total final energy demand
Electricity (Mtoe) 237.1 268.0 338.1 406.1 474.5 546.5
Heat (Mtoe) 48.7 39.9 44.2 49.3 54.0 56.7
Natural gas (Mtoe) 292.3 275.2 317.1 330.5 340.5 340.1
Oil (Mtoe) 619.3 599.0 632.2 615.8 588.2 554.6
Coal (Mtoe) 68.5 73.1 56.7 50.7 49.0 49.7
Biomass (Mtoe) 56.3 61.1 77.9 101.9 132.3 165.5
Other (Mtoe) 0.2 0.8 1.9 3.8 5.7 7.3
Total 1322.4 1317.1 1468.0 1558.0 1644.2 1720.4
Emissions
CO2 Total (Mt CO2) 4220.5 4320.2 4492.8 4451.8 4481.6 4355.9
CO2 Power Sector 1384.2 1464.8 1567.5 1622.7 1761.0 1775.0
CO2 other conversion + process emissions 405.2 541.7 568.1 577.2 592.3 601.8
CO2 industry 690.5 692.0 706.1 716.6 753.5 773.5
CO2 transport 996.9 984.1 1009.6 904.0 757.7 601.6
CO2 residential, services 743.7 637.6 641.5 631.3 617.1 604.0
GHG Total (Mt CO2eq) 4636.0 4719.0 4892.3 4881.9 4948.3 4865.5
GHG Power Sector 1289.0 1391.6 1505.7 1560.4 1697.7 1710.6
GHG other conversion + process emissions 358.5 431.3 414.4 419.5 436.9 449.7
GHG industry 1061.6 1088.1 1139.7 1188.1 1264.5 1329.8
GHG transport 1017.9 1006.9 1033.9 926.7 777.9 619.0
GHG residential, services 909.0 801.1 798.6 787.2 771.3 756.4  
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Mitigation Scenario - European Union EU27
2005 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
Indicators
GDP (M€ PPP) 10297.0 11282.8 14018.3 16442.7 18694.7 21198.8
Population (Mcap) 490.8 495.6 498.8 496.5 489.9 479.9
GDP per capita (€/cap) 20978.7 22764.9 28102.6 33114.7 38162.6 44176.2
Gross inland consumption per capita (toe/cap) 3707.6 3764.9 3915.8 3909.8 3937.7 3986.9
Gross inland consumption/GDP (toe/€) 176.7 165.4 139.3 118.1 103.2 90.2
CO2/Gross inland consumption (tCO2/toe) 2319.2 2213.4 1889.1 1614.3 1218.8 756.0
Gross inland consumption
Natural gas (Mtoe) 443.0 436.7 550.3 552.4 501.0 368.9
Oil (Mtoe) 669.1 649.9 584.9 492.1 377.4 253.3
Coal (Mtoe) 323.2 328.2 224.6 195.8 160.1 117.1
Nuclear (Mtoe) 259.7 259.3 262.4 344.7 433.5 573.6
Other (Mtoe) 124.7 191.9 331.2 356.3 457.0 600.3
Total 1819.8 1866.0 1953.3 1941.3 1928.9 1913.2
Electricity generation
Fuel input for power generation
Natural gas (Mtoe) 126.9 145.5 227.2 252.0 247.6 205.1
Oil (Mtoe) 33.8 28.7 15.7 10.0 6.8 4.1
Coal (Mtoe) 238.5 234.7 164.1 147.8 130.3 102.6
Nuclear (Mtoe) 259.7 259.3 262.4 344.7 433.5 573.6
Others (Biomass) (Mtoe) 28.5 30.1 94.6 81.9 91.8 125.3
Total 687.4 698.3 763.9 836.4 910.0 1010.7
Net generation capacities
Natural gas (GW) 154.4 180.6 243.0 287.2 280.9 240.4
Oil (GW) 58.4 51.7 38.2 27.0 19.2 13.6
Coal (GW) 184.7 182.5 163.6 156.6 121.3 91.6
Nuclear (GW) 137.6 136.4 141.2 185.6 231.8 302.8
Hydro (GW) 131.7 133.2 135.8 137.6 138.8 139.5
Renewables (GW) 196.1 229.1 326.0 421.5 549.2 720.5
Total 862.9 913.5 1047.8 1215.5 1341.2 1508.4
Net electricity generation
Natural gas (TWh) 646.2 688.2 1156.0 1288.6 1223.4 974.8
Oil (TWh) 144.0 117.2 64.6 41.9 28.9 17.5
Coal (TWh) 966.2 907.9 719.6 695.5 621.8 497.4
Nuclear (TWh) 996.8 995.1 1006.9 1323.0 1663.6 2201.3
Hydro (TWh) 302.0 451.4 461.1 466.1 468.3 468.8
Renewables (TWh) 499.3 707.2 1120.2 1297.6 1624.0 2108.9
Total 3554.5 3867.0 4528.4 5112.7 5630.0 6268.7
Final Energy Demand
Demand of fuel by sectors
Industry 449.3 445.8 475.4 490.8 490.4 477.1
Commercial and households 456.5 424.5 447.7 434.9 417.1 395.0
Transport 387.1 387.5 372.4 320.7 273.2 224.8
Agriculture 29.6 30.7 34.9 38.7 41.5 44.1
Total final energy demand
Electricity (Mtoe) 237.1 265.0 321.0 371.6 420.7 479.0
Heat (Mtoe) 48.7 39.9 44.2 49.3 54.0 56.7
Natural gas (Mtoe) 292.3 274.0 297.9 274.2 229.0 145.4
Oil (Mtoe) 619.3 578.7 530.7 449.5 345.3 232.2
Coal (Mtoe) 68.5 67.8 44.6 35.0 20.3 8.3
Biomass (Mtoe) 56.3 62.2 90.6 103.1 149.5 214.3
Other (Mtoe) 0.2 0.7 1.3 2.4 3.4 5.1
Total 1322.4 1288.5 1330.4 1285.1 1222.2 1141.0
Emissions
CO2 Total (Mt CO2) 4220.5 4130.2 3690.0 3133.9 2350.9 1446.3
CO2 Power Sector 1384.1 1367.8 1186.2 953.8 632.1 303.9
CO2 other conversion + process emissions 405.4 528.4 517.1 492.9 442.4 353.3
CO2 industry 690.5 664.0 633.0 597.9 487.6 311.6
CO2 transport 996.8 932.6 749.3 600.8 424.5 252.7
CO2 residential, services 743.7 637.4 604.4 488.5 364.3 224.8
GHG Total (Mt CO2eq) 4631.1 4512.6 3986.8 3405.1 2548.2 1563.0
GHG Power Sector 1293.8 1296.3 1128.0 900.8 584.8 262.9
GHG other conversion + process emissions 348.8 415.6 359.0 323.8 275.5 207.8
GHG industry 1061.6 1049.3 1042.7 1005.9 839.6 566.8
GHG transport 1017.9 954.6 768.5 615.6 434.6 258.5
GHG residential, services 909.0 796.8 688.6 559.0 413.7 267.0  
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Baseline Scenario - World*
2005 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
Indicators
GDP (M€ PPP) 49182.8 60161.6 86839.8 116369.0 149364.0 187318.0
Population (Mcap) 6514.8 6906.5 7667.1 8317.7 8823.5 9191.3
GDP per capita (€/cap) 7549.5 8710.8 11326.3 13990.5 16927.9 20379.9
Gross inland consumption per capita (toe/cap) 1729.0 1793.2 2021.0 2237.2 2455.9 2677.7
Gross inland consumption/GDP (toe/€) 229.0 205.9 178.4 159.9 145.1 131.4
CO2/Gross inland consumption (tCO2/toe) 2502.1 2533.3 2482.2 2381.8 2276.6 2133.0
Gross consumption
Natural gas (Mtoe) 2370.4 2346.6 3140.8 3488.0 3836.5 4111.1
Oil (Mtoe) 4193.1 4158.4 4869.7 5245.1 5463.4 5477.9
Coal (Mtoe) 2915.9 3781.7 4741.8 6016.2 7187.9 8060.9
Nuclear (Mtoe) 719.7 792.5 1008.1 1472.1 2081.2 2971.1
Other (Mtoe) 1411.2 1710.9 2295.8 3143.6 4020.8 5040.8
Total 11610.2 12790.0 16056.1 19365.0 22589.7 25661.9
Electricity generation
Fuel input for power generation
Natural gas (Mtoe) 815.7 808.5 1146.0 1250.8 1369.6 1475.0
Oil (Mtoe) 287.6 282.1 160.2 146.8 160.5 177.1
Coal (Mtoe) 1903.9 2410.3 3112.3 4090.9 5095.3 5899.7
Nuclear (Mtoe) 719.7 792.5 1008.1 1472.1 2081.2 2971.1
Others (Biomass) (Mtoe) 72.7 108.7 274.9 482.2 666.1 870.2
Total 3799.6 4402.1 5701.4 7442.8 9372.7 11393.2
Net generation capacities
Natural gas (GW) 933.1 1005.6 1390.7 1792.3 2091.7 2289.0
Oil (GW) 462.0 467.5 373.7 280.9 241.6 230.9
Coal (GW) 1324.4 1769.8 2492.9 3467.4 4348.3 5125.0
Nuclear (GW) 381.5 408.7 536.1 794.0 1119.9 1586.6
Hydro (GW) 805.4 885.0 1008.6 1088.6 1158.0 1213.5
Renewables (GW) 956.1 1135.4 1635.4 2269.6 3006.8 4009.3
Total 4862.5 5672.0 7437.4 9692.8 11966.3 14454.3
Net electricity generation
Natural gas (TWh) 3579.9 3571.6 5736.5 6524.7 7002.3 7163.0
Oil (TWh) 1165.3 1173.9 683.9 630.6 693.8 777.7
Coal (TWh) 7087.0 9421.7 13829.7 19868.6 25571.5 30290.4
Nuclear (TWh) 2762.0 3041.5 3868.8 5649.9 7987.6 11402.8
Hydro (TWh) 2712.5 3138.5 3581.2 3869.2 4118.4 4318.8
Renewables (TWh) 3144.3 3922.8 5749.0 8023.0 10577.4 13941.2
Total 20451.0 24270.0 33449.1 44566.0 55951.0 67893.9
Final Energy Demand
Demand of fuel by sectors
Industry 2951.0 3247.4 4129.8 4746.5 5145.8 5284.4
Commercial and households 2717.6 2746.7 3362.6 3989.5 4575.3 5188.7
Transport 2321.2 2484.6 3117.8 3635.3 4133.9 4642.3
Agriculture 180.6 202.5 266.4 341.0 415.2 495.6
Total final energy demand
Electricity (Mtoe) 1285.7 1537.5 2158.4 2935.4 3749.0 4628.2
Heat (Mtoe) 247.7 239.5 254.4 272.5 288.5 295.7
Natural gas (Mtoe) 1152.8 1146.3 1459.8 1630.3 1778.5 1889.3
Oil (Mtoe) 3622.1 3673.7 4472.9 4916.0 5174.4 5225.9
Coal (Mtoe) 815.7 998.6 1225.4 1341.7 1345.9 1268.5
Biomass (Mtoe) 1045.6 1081.2 1295.0 1586.7 1878.8 2216.8
Other (Mtoe) 0.9 4.4 10.8 29.7 55.2 86.6
Total 8170.4 8681.1 10876.6 12712.3 14270.2 15611.0
Emissions
CO2 Total (Mt CO2) 29243.5 32613.7 40176.5 46632.3 52141.4 55697.4
CO2 Power Sector 10246.4 12175.8 15274.6 19185.4 23278.2 26563.0
CO2 other conversion + process emissions 3927.7 4628.8 5594.0 6456.8 7182.7 7719.8
CO2 industry 5155.2 5836.6 7232.0 7928.7 8186.2 7951.6
CO2 transport 6645.1 6917.3 8317.9 8754.4 8797.7 8482.7
CO2 residential, services 3269.1 3055.2 3758.0 4307.0 4696.6 4980.3
GHG Total (Mt CO2eq) 33305.3 37126.2 45480.8 52852.5 59178.6 63433.0
GHG Power Sector 8476.7 10211.7 13111.0 16763.1 20660.7 23801.4
GHG other conversion + process emissions 6097.4 6883.5 7813.7 8987.2 10009.1 10811.2
GHG industry 7005.9 8054.2 10006.6 11074.9 11589.3 11529.9
GHG transport 6721.3 6994.6 8403.3 8835.2 8869.9 8544.5
GHG residential, services 5004.0 4982.2 6146.2 7192.1 8049.6 8746.0
*Including international bunkers  
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Mitigation Scenario - World*
2005 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
Indicators
GDP (M€ PPP) 49182.8 60161.6 86839.8 116369.0 149364.0 187318.0
Population (Mcap) 6514.8 6906.5 7667.1 8317.7 8823.5 9191.3
GDP per capita (€/cap) 7549.5 8710.8 11326.3 13990.5 16927.9 20379.9
Gross inland consumption per capita (toe/cap) 1729.0 1750.9 1803.2 1768.9 1802.4 1832.0
Gross inland consumption/GDP (toe/€) 229.0 201.0 159.2 126.4 106.5 89.9
CO2/Gross inland consumption (tCO2/toe) 2502.1 2517.9 2255.3 1783.6 1238.6 664.9
Gross consumption
Natural gas (Mtoe) 2370.4 2312.5 2970.3 2992.2 2718.8 1951.4
Oil (Mtoe) 4193.1 4012.8 4432.9 4483.9 4124.8 3287.5
Coal (Mtoe) 2915.9 3675.7 3341.0 2613.1 2166.5 1678.2
Nuclear (Mtoe) 719.7 801.3 1299.2 2193.3 3371.9 4796.5
Other (Mtoe) 1411.1 1695.2 2338.3 3154.5 4374.4 6056.5
Total 11610.1 12497.4 14381.6 15436.9 16756.3 17770.1
Electricity generation
Fuel input for power generation
Natural gas (Mtoe) 815.7 800.6 1143.3 1176.4 1095.3 848.2
Oil (Mtoe) 287.6 278.0 191.5 145.2 103.0 49.8
Coal (Mtoe) 1903.9 2323.9 2055.5 1694.9 1562.3 1352.4
Nuclear (Mtoe) 719.7 801.3 1299.2 2193.3 3371.9 4796.5
Others (Biomass) (Mtoe) 72.7 111.8 386.2 650.4 943.6 1409.4
Total 3799.6 4315.5 5075.6 5860.2 7076.2 8456.3
Net generation capacities
Natural gas (GW) 933.1 1004.5 1269.5 1416.7 1450.4 1370.1
Oil (GW) 462.0 467.3 381.1 275.7 208.5 160.3
Coal (GW) 1324.4 1723.4 2010.9 1918.0 1607.9 1482.4
Nuclear (GW) 381.5 413.3 690.4 1185.0 1821.0 2573.0
Hydro (GW) 805.4 884.7 1020.4 1119.0 1190.4 1235.9
Renewables (GW) 956.1 1145.7 1851.0 2750.7 3749.5 5186.8
Total 4862.5 5638.9 7223.3 8665.1 10027.7 12008.5
Net electricity generation
Natural gas (TWh) 3579.9 3528.0 5610.0 5941.8 5397.0 4080.4
Oil (TWh) 1165.3 1156.2 813.9 617.6 438.9 213.4
Coal (TWh) 7087.0 9099.4 9125.9 8027.0 7484.8 6639.7
Nuclear (TWh) 2762.0 3075.3 4986.0 8417.6 12941.0 18408.3
Hydro (TWh) 2712.4 3137.2 3622.8 3975.8 4232.3 4397.8
Renewables (TWh) 3144.2 3952.5 6613.8 9787.5 13359.0 18491.0
Total 20450.8 23948.6 30772.4 36767.3 43853.0 52230.6
Final Energy Demand
Demand of fuel by sectors
Industry 2950.7 3204.6 3693.9 3488.9 3361.7 3127.6
Commercial and households 2717.2 2704.8 3137.6 3424.5 3547.0 3488.5
Transport 2319.5 2374.1 2731.6 3019.1 3241.7 3407.8
Agriculture 180.6 199.8 252.2 307.2 361.7 413.0
Total final energy demand
Electricity (Mtoe) 1285.5 1515.8 1967.4 2377.6 2894.3 3525.7
Heat (Mtoe) 247.7 239.5 254.4 272.5 288.5 295.7
Natural gas (Mtoe) 1152.6 1128.9 1338.0 1322.6 1159.2 758.0
Oil (Mtoe) 3620.3 3542.2 4004.3 4118.7 3845.2 3122.0
Coal (Mtoe) 815.7 987.8 1013.9 680.3 404.8 181.5
Biomass (Mtoe) 1045.5 1065.3 1230.7 1452.3 1883.1 2466.6
Other (Mtoe) 0.9 3.8 6.7 15.7 37.0 87.5
Total 8168.1 8483.3 9815.3 10239.7 10512.2 10436.9
Emissions
CO2 Total (Mt CO2) 29243.5 31686.3 32880.7 28455.8 22303.1 14040.9
CO2 Power Sector 10246.2 11802.4 11123.8 7985.9 4591.3 1211.6
CO2 other conversion + process emissions 3934.0 4540.2 4839.3 4684.4 4316.9 3421.6
CO2 industry 5154.8 5762.9 6195.9 4793.3 3618.9 2257.3
CO2 transport 6639.9 6584.1 7228.5 7380.4 6793.3 5379.8
CO2 residential, services 3268.6 2996.7 3493.2 3611.8 2982.7 1770.6
GHG Total (Mt CO2eq) 33299.8 36152.2 36611.8 31501.5 24462.4 15631.1
GHG Power Sector 8481.4 9859.5 9981.8 6983.2 3728.5 579.5
GHG other conversion + process emissions 6093.8 6753.4 5043.1 4458.1 3832.7 2737.3
GHG industry 7004.9 7969.2 8690.5 7385.2 6043.3 4253.7
GHG transport 6716.2 6656.3 7299.0 7440.7 6840.0 5410.1
GHG residential, services 5003.5 4913.8 5597.4 5234.3 4017.9 2650.5
*Including international bunkers  
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Baseline Scenario - Developed countries
2005 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
Indicators
GDP (M€ PPP) 27232.5 30255.4 39037.5 47890.9 56775.2 65806.5
Population (Mcap) 1187.6 1205.6 1229.4 1239.3 1238.3 1229.7
GDP per capita (€/cap) 22930.5 25095.9 31753.3 38645.1 45847.5 53513.0
Gross inland consumption per capita (toe/cap) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Gross inland consumption/GDP (toe/€) 218.3 197.5 171.6 152.4 138.9 127.1
CO2/Gross inland consumption (tCO2/toe) 2462.4 2441.3 2333.3 2183.6 2037.1 1866.1
Gross inland consumption
Natural gas (Mtoe) 1555.3 1411.1 1746.2 1757.6 1754.2 1677.0
Oil (Mtoe) 2197.4 1998.8 2131.6 2055.6 1920.0 1738.1
Coal (Mtoe) 1211.5 1435.3 1452.3 1657.5 1886.6 2047.6
Nuclear (Mtoe) 638.3 637.8 661.1 798.5 986.5 1263.6
Other (Mtoe) 341.9 491.9 709.4 1028.2 1336.5 1639.6
Total 5944.5 5975.0 6700.6 7297.4 7883.8 8365.8
Electricity generation
Fuel input for power generation
Natural gas (Mtoe) 497.2 455.1 627.7 611.6 605.5 568.5
Oil (Mtoe) 105.6 53.1 30.2 27.3 29.2 26.5
Coal (Mtoe) 885.7 1059.3 1101.7 1244.4 1421.6 1531.1
Nuclear (Mtoe) 638.3 637.8 661.1 798.5 986.5 1263.6
Others (Biomass) (Mtoe) 60.8 71.3 156.6 243.5 291.3 321.3
Total 2187.6 2276.5 2577.3 2925.2 3334.1 3711.0
Net generation capacities
Natural gas (GW) 675.4 696.3 829.4 896.2 917.8 901.3
Oil (GW) 260.2 223.1 159.9 113.2 81.0 58.7
Coal (GW) 733.1 766.3 819.7 1001.7 1152.3 1274.4
Nuclear (GW) 336.9 328.7 351.5 430.0 529.0 671.5
Hydro (GW) 443.7 450.7 463.5 474.5 482.4 486.9
Renewables (GW) 546.5 611.2 818.5 1097.2 1372.3 1716.3
Total 2995.8 3076.3 3442.5 4012.8 4534.8 5109.1
Net electricity generation
Natural gas (TWh) 2227.0 2002.0 3091.6 3037.4 2888.2 2504.9
Oil (TWh) 417.6 229.1 131.4 119.0 127.1 115.9
Coal (TWh) 3577.1 4359.4 4951.1 6061.5 7226.1 8034.1
Nuclear (TWh) 2449.9 2447.9 2537.3 3064.5 3786.0 4849.5
Hydro (TWh) 1432.8 1593.3 1642.8 1683.2 1710.5 1725.3
Renewables (TWh) 1787.6 2080.4 2831.0 3760.2 4579.7 5469.0
Total 11892.0 12712.1 15185.2 17725.8 20317.6 22698.7
Final Energy Demand
Demand of fuel by sectors
Industry 1407.9 1369.8 1532.2 1648.8 1771.9 1855.9
Commercial and households 1334.7 1254.2 1418.0 1531.5 1611.6 1682.8
Transport 1277.4 1286.3 1453.5 1510.7 1533.9 1541.6
Agriculture 73.9 77.0 91.4 107.4 123.7 140.4
Total final energy demand
Electricity (Mtoe) 785.8 850.2 1041.5 1245.1 1458.1 1666.7
Heat (Mtoe) 199.0 183.5 188.5 194.4 199.1 200.1
Natural gas (Mtoe) 816.9 747.2 864.2 890.6 889.6 863.0
Oil (Mtoe) 1953.9 1849.0 1995.1 1959.7 1855.8 1704.7
Coal (Mtoe) 210.2 231.3 227.7 227.9 227.3 230.8
Biomass (Mtoe) 127.7 123.3 172.3 265.7 385.6 519.6
Other (Mtoe) 0.5 2.7 5.8 14.9 25.5 35.8
Total 4093.9 3987.2 4495.1 4798.3 5041.0 5220.6
Emissions
CO2 Total (Mt CO2) 14637.5 14586.9 15634.5 15934.6 16060.3 15611.2
CO2 Power Sector 4992.4 5393.1 5858.2 6286.4 6843.0 7033.0
CO2 other conversion + process emissions 2032.3 1975.9 2062.7 2173.6 2249.7 2263.4
CO2 industry 2070.8 2053.1 2176.7 2229.4 2301.3 2323.3
CO2 transport 3599.8 3507.9 3776.0 3473.2 2936.4 2311.9
CO2 residential, services 1942.2 1656.9 1760.9 1772.0 1729.9 1679.6
GHG Total (Mt CO2eq) 16199.7 16147.5 17111.9 17482.9 17722.1 17379.3
GHG Power Sector 4333.8 4760.5 5359.5 5815.5 6359.5 6543.4
GHG other conversion + process emissions 2762.6 2618.8 2384.5 2414.7 2506.1 2534.3
GHG industry 3032.2 3076.1 3307.0 3491.7 3688.3 3823.0
GHG transport 3669.4 3577.6 3851.5 3543.1 2996.8 2361.3
GHG residential, services 2401.7 2114.5 2209.4 2217.9 2171.4 2117.3  
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Mitigation Scenario - Developed countries
2005 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
Indicators
GDP (M€ PPP) 27232.5 30255.4 39037.5 47890.9 56775.2 65806.5
Population (Mcap) 1187.6 1205.6 1229.4 1239.3 1238.3 1229.7
GDP per capita (€/cap) 22930.5 25095.9 31753.3 38645.1 45847.5 53513.0
Gross inland consumption per capita (toe/cap) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Gross inland consumption/GDP (toe/€) 218.3 193.7 156.4 128.5 108.8 92.8
CO2/Gross inland consumption (tCO2/toe) 2462.3 2412.8 2032.1 1654.2 1194.3 707.1
Gross inland consumption
Natural gas (Mtoe) 1555.3 1421.9 1709.9 1584.6 1345.6 920.4
Oil (Mtoe) 2197.4 1913.1 1883.1 1654.2 1344.5 969.8
Coal (Mtoe) 1211.5 1382.9 866.7 704.6 535.2 377.1
Nuclear (Mtoe) 638.3 645.8 828.2 1098.4 1449.4 1874.8
Other (Mtoe) 341.9 497.1 818.9 1110.8 1501.9 1964.5
Total 5944.5 5860.8 6106.8 6152.6 6176.8 6106.6
Electricity generation
Fuel input for power generation
Natural gas (Mtoe) 497.2 466.0 645.1 609.6 542.6 413.5
Oil (Mtoe) 105.6 55.1 41.8 29.7 21.7 10.9
Coal (Mtoe) 885.6 1015.9 634.5 509.1 408.3 312.8
Nuclear (Mtoe) 638.3 645.8 828.2 1098.4 1449.4 1874.8
Others (Biomass) (Mtoe) 60.8 74.9 237.4 314.4 366.3 422.0
Total 2187.6 2257.7 2387.1 2561.2 2788.3 3034.0
Net generation capacities
Natural gas (GW) 675.4 698.9 789.8 800.1 747.2 635.2
Oil (GW) 260.2 224.1 161.5 114.2 81.5 58.2
Coal (GW) 733.1 741.9 661.2 598.3 453.2 350.7
Nuclear (GW) 336.9 333.0 439.9 592.1 780.7 1002.9
Hydro (GW) 443.7 450.9 468.7 481.7 490.1 494.5
Renewables (GW) 546.5 621.9 952.4 1296.3 1663.8 2131.4
Total 2995.8 3070.7 3473.5 3882.7 4216.5 4672.9
Net electricity generation
Natural gas (TWh) 2227.0 2046.9 3146.1 3014.2 2592.4 1907.4
Oil (TWh) 417.6 237.5 181.9 128.7 94.4 47.5
Coal (TWh) 3577.0 4193.2 2829.1 2378.8 1937.1 1512.1
Nuclear (TWh) 2449.9 2478.5 3178.5 4215.7 5562.7 7195.1
Hydro (TWh) 1432.8 1593.8 1661.0 1709.2 1739.8 1754.3
Renewables (TWh) 1787.6 2113.0 3389.3 4456.3 5509.4 6735.8
Total 11891.9 12662.9 14385.9 15902.9 17435.8 19152.2
Final Energy Demand
Demand of fuel by sectors
Industry 1407.9 1359.2 1397.0 1388.0 1359.0 1285.5
Commercial and households 1334.7 1252.6 1365.0 1366.4 1312.7 1242.3
Transport 1277.4 1206.9 1227.7 1149.5 1068.2 983.9
Agriculture 73.9 76.9 90.8 105.1 117.7 128.4
Total final energy demand
Electricity (Mtoe) 785.8 846.8 981.7 1104.9 1239.8 1395.6
Heat (Mtoe) 199.0 183.5 188.5 194.4 199.1 200.1
Natural gas (Mtoe) 816.9 746.6 824.8 762.5 620.7 384.8
Oil (Mtoe) 1953.8 1766.2 1736.0 1543.4 1263.4 916.8
Coal (Mtoe) 210.2 226.6 164.3 123.7 71.7 30.6
Biomass (Mtoe) 127.7 123.5 181.5 271.1 444.8 679.0
Other (Mtoe) 0.5 2.3 3.8 9.0 18.1 33.3
Total 4093.9 3895.6 4080.4 4009.0 3857.6 3640.2
Emissions
CO2 Total (Mt CO2) 14637.4 14141.1 12409.7 10177.5 7377.1 4317.8
CO2 Power Sector 4992.3 5249.8 3992.1 2863.7 1664.3 609.6
CO2 other conversion + process emissions 2032.4 1943.3 1769.4 1583.9 1351.9 1013.1
CO2 industry 2070.8 2026.7 1842.8 1626.0 1300.6 850.0
CO2 transport 3599.7 3264.4 3085.5 2583.2 1914.6 1153.4
CO2 residential, services 1942.2 1656.9 1719.9 1520.7 1145.7 691.7
GHG Total (Mt CO2eq) 16194.1 15678.9 13427.1 11025.0 8084.5 4858.3
GHG Power Sector 4338.7 4620.9 3630.5 2604.1 1450.8 461.0
GHG other conversion + process emissions 2752.8 2579.7 1827.1 1425.2 1124.6 741.6
GHG industry 3031.6 3038.6 2837.4 2620.1 2154.2 1465.5
GHG transport 3669.3 3329.3 3147.3 2633.7 1951.8 1176.3
GHG residential, services 2401.7 2110.4 1984.8 1741.9 1403.1 1013.9  
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Baseline Scenario - Developing countries
2005 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
Indicators
GDP (M€ PPP) 21950.4 29906.2 47802.3 68478.3 92589.1 121511.0
Population (Mcap) 5327.1 5701.0 6437.7 7078.5 7585.2 7961.6
GDP per capita (€/cap) 4120.5 5245.8 7425.4 9674.2 12206.5 15262.2
Gross inland consumption per capita (toe/cap) 998.6 1124.4 1366.1 1597.9 1817.4 2040.5
Gross inland consumption/GDP (toe/€) 242.4 214.3 184.0 165.2 148.9 133.7
CO2/Gross inland consumption (tCO2/toe) 2546.6 2619.0 2595.7 2509.6 2413.5 2270.4
Gross inland consumption
Natural gas (Mtoe) 815.1 935.5 1394.7 1730.4 2082.2 2434.1
Oil (Mtoe) 1649.8 1754.4 2177.0 2432.7 2623.0 2689.7
Coal (Mtoe) 1704.3 2346.3 3289.5 4358.7 5301.4 6013.4
Nuclear (Mtoe) 81.3 154.7 346.9 673.6 1094.8 1707.5
Other (Mtoe) 1069.3 1218.9 1586.4 2115.4 2684.3 3401.2
Total 5319.8 6409.9 8794.5 11310.7 13785.7 16245.9
Electricity generation
Fuel input for power generation
Natural gas (Mtoe) 318.5 353.4 518.4 639.2 764.1 906.5
Oil (Mtoe) 182.0 229.0 130.0 119.5 131.4 150.7
Coal (Mtoe) 1018.3 1351.1 2010.6 2846.5 3673.7 4368.6
Nuclear (Mtoe) 81.3 154.7 346.9 673.6 1094.8 1707.5
Others (Biomass) (Mtoe) 12.0 37.5 118.2 238.7 374.7 548.9
Total 1612.0 2125.6 3124.1 4517.5 6038.7 7682.2
Net generation capacities
Natural gas (GW) 257.6 309.3 561.3 896.1 1173.8 1387.7
Oil (GW) 201.8 244.4 213.8 167.6 160.7 172.2
Coal (GW) 591.3 1003.5 1673.2 2465.6 3196.0 3850.5
Nuclear (GW) 44.6 79.9 184.6 364.0 590.9 915.2
Hydro (GW) 361.7 434.3 545.1 614.1 675.6 726.6
Renewables (GW) 409.5 524.3 816.9 1172.4 1634.5 2293.1
Total 1866.5 2595.7 3994.9 5679.8 7431.5 9345.3
Net electricity generation
Natural gas (TWh) 1352.9 1569.6 2644.9 3487.3 4114.1 4658.1
Oil (TWh) 747.7 944.8 552.5 511.6 566.7 661.8
Coal (TWh) 3510.0 5062.3 8878.6 13807.1 18345.5 22256.2
Nuclear (TWh) 312.1 593.7 1331.5 2585.4 4201.5 6553.3
Hydro (TWh) 1279.7 1545.2 1938.4 2186.1 2407.9 2593.5
Renewables (TWh) 1356.7 1842.4 2918.0 4262.8 5997.7 8472.2
Total 8559.1 11558.0 18263.9 26840.3 35633.4 45195.1
Final Energy Demand
Demand of fuel by sectors
Industry 1543.2 1877.6 2597.6 3097.7 3374.0 3428.5
Commercial and households 1382.8 1492.5 1944.6 2458.0 2963.7 3505.9
Transport 697.8 793.2 1103.3 1367.7 1679.7 2050.5
Agriculture 106.7 125.5 175.0 233.6 291.5 355.2
Total final energy demand
Electricity (Mtoe) 499.9 687.4 1116.9 1690.3 2290.9 2961.5
Heat (Mtoe) 48.7 56.0 65.9 78.1 89.4 95.6
Natural gas (Mtoe) 335.9 399.1 595.6 739.7 888.9 1026.3
Oil (Mtoe) 1322.2 1419.5 1916.8 2199.4 2398.2 2471.0
Coal (Mtoe) 605.5 767.3 997.7 1113.7 1118.6 1037.8
Biomass (Mtoe) 917.9 957.9 1122.7 1321.1 1493.1 1697.2
Other (Mtoe) 0.3 1.6 5.0 14.9 29.7 50.8
Total 3730.5 4288.8 5820.5 7157.1 8308.8 9340.2
Emissions
CO2 Total (Mt CO2) 13547.1 16787.8 22827.7 28385.3 33271.5 36884.4
CO2 Power Sector 5253.9 6782.8 9416.4 12899.0 16435.2 19530.0
CO2 other conversion + process emissions 1895.4 2652.9 3531.3 4283.3 4932.9 5456.4
CO2 industry 3084.4 3783.5 5055.3 5699.3 5884.9 5628.3
CO2 transport 1986.4 2170.3 2827.6 2968.8 3051.8 2969.0
CO2 residential, services 1327.0 1398.3 1997.1 2534.9 2966.7 3300.7
GHG Total (Mt CO2eq) 16046.7 19739.6 26654.6 33057.2 38647.0 42851.9
GHG Power Sector 4142.8 5451.2 7751.5 10947.7 14301.2 17258.1
GHG other conversion + process emissions 3334.9 4264.8 5429.0 6572.4 7503.0 8276.8
GHG industry 3973.7 4978.0 6699.7 7583.2 7901.0 7706.9
GHG transport 1993.0 2177.9 2837.6 2979.7 3063.6 2981.4
GHG residential, services 2602.3 2867.7 3936.8 4974.2 5878.2 6628.7  
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Mitigation Scenario - Developing countries
2005 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
Indicators
GDP (M€ PPP) 21950.4 29906.2 47802.3 68478.3 92589.1 121511.0
Population (Mcap) 5327.1 5701.0 6437.7 7078.5 7585.2 7961.6
GDP per capita (€/cap) 4120.5 5245.8 7425.4 9674.2 12206.5 15262.2
Gross inland consumption per capita (toe/cap) 998.6 1093.1 1198.9 1209.4 1282.4 1347.9
Gross inland consumption/GDP (toe/€) 242.3 208.4 161.5 125.0 105.1 88.3
CO2/Gross inland consumption (tCO2/toe) 2546.6 2616.7 2431.9 1876.7 1266.6 640.8
Gross inland consumption
Natural gas (Mtoe) 815.1 890.6 1260.3 1407.6 1373.1 1031.0
Oil (Mtoe) 1649.8 1694.6 1993.3 2105.8 1927.9 1385.9
Coal (Mtoe) 1704.3 2292.8 2474.3 1908.5 1631.3 1301.1
Nuclear (Mtoe) 81.3 155.5 471.0 1094.8 1922.5 2921.7
Other (Mtoe) 1069.2 1198.1 1519.4 2043.7 2872.4 4092.0
Total 5319.7 6231.7 7718.3 8560.4 9727.3 10731.7
Electricity generation
Fuel input for power generation
Natural gas (Mtoe) 318.5 334.6 498.2 566.9 552.8 434.7
Oil (Mtoe) 182.0 222.8 149.7 115.5 81.3 38.9
Coal (Mtoe) 1018.3 1308.0 1421.0 1185.8 1154.1 1039.6
Nuclear (Mtoe) 81.3 155.5 471.0 1094.8 1922.5 2921.7
Others (Biomass) (Mtoe) 12.0 36.9 148.7 336.1 577.3 987.4
Total 1612.0 2057.9 2688.5 3299.0 4287.9 5422.3
Net generation capacities
Natural gas (GW) 257.6 305.6 479.7 616.7 703.1 734.9
Oil (GW) 201.8 243.2 219.5 161.5 127.0 102.2
Coal (GW) 591.3 981.4 1349.7 1319.8 1154.7 1131.8
Nuclear (GW) 44.6 80.3 250.5 592.9 1040.3 1570.0
Hydro (GW) 361.7 433.8 551.7 637.4 700.2 741.4
Renewables (GW) 409.5 523.8 898.6 1454.4 2085.6 3055.3
Total 1866.5 2568.1 3749.7 4782.7 5810.9 7335.6
Net electricity generation
Natural gas (TWh) 1352.9 1481.1 2463.9 2927.5 2804.6 2173.0
Oil (TWh) 747.7 918.6 632.0 489.0 344.6 165.8
Coal (TWh) 3510.0 4906.2 6296.8 5648.2 5547.7 5127.6
Nuclear (TWh) 312.1 596.8 1807.5 4201.9 7378.3 11213.2
Hydro (TWh) 1279.7 1543.4 1961.7 2266.6 2492.5 2643.5
Renewables (TWh) 1356.6 1839.4 3224.6 5331.2 7849.6 11755.2
Total 8559.0 11285.5 16386.5 20864.4 26417.3 33078.3
Final Energy Demand
Demand of fuel by sectors
Industry 1542.8 1845.4 2296.9 2101.0 2002.8 1842.0
Commercial and households 1382.5 1452.2 1772.7 2058.0 2234.3 2246.2
Transport 696.2 762.1 947.4 1145.7 1321.2 1492.1
Agriculture 106.7 123.0 161.4 202.0 243.9 284.5
Total final energy demand
Electricity (Mtoe) 499.7 669.0 985.7 1272.7 1654.6 2130.1
Heat (Mtoe) 48.7 56.0 65.9 78.1 89.4 95.6
Natural gas (Mtoe) 335.7 382.2 513.3 560.1 538.5 373.2
Oil (Mtoe) 1320.5 1371.0 1711.8 1851.4 1729.5 1273.4
Coal (Mtoe) 605.5 761.2 849.6 556.6 333.0 150.9
Biomass (Mtoe) 917.8 941.8 1049.1 1181.1 1438.3 1787.6
Other (Mtoe) 0.3 1.5 2.9 6.7 19.0 54.2
Total 3728.2 4182.7 5178.4 5506.7 5802.2 5864.9
Emissions
CO2 Total (Mt CO2) 13547.2 16306.3 18770.2 16065.2 12321.0 6877.1
CO2 Power Sector 5253.9 6552.7 7131.8 5122.2 2926.9 602.0
CO2 other conversion + process emissions 1901.5 2596.9 3069.9 3100.5 2965.1 2408.3
CO2 industry 3084.0 3736.2 4353.1 3167.3 2318.3 1407.4
CO2 transport 1981.3 2080.8 2442.2 2584.1 2273.7 1380.5
CO2 residential, services 1326.5 1339.7 1773.2 2091.1 1837.0 1078.9
GHG Total (Mt CO2eq) 16046.7 19234.4 21483.9 18263.5 13772.9 7926.9
GHG Power Sector 4142.8 5238.6 6351.3 4379.1 2277.7 118.5
GHG other conversion + process emissions 3340.9 4173.7 3216.0 3033.0 2708.1 1995.6
GHG industry 3973.3 4930.6 5853.1 4765.1 3889.1 2788.2
GHG transport 1988.0 2088.1 2450.9 2593.9 2283.2 1387.9
GHG residential, services 2601.7 2803.4 3612.6 3492.4 2614.8 1636.7  
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